HUMAN quest for security is recurrent. Over the ages, emerging forms of human, social and political organisations have stimulated a necessity for the protection and safety of the individual, family, community and nation.

As threats continue to transform and multiply, insecurity emerges as the most dominant fear of human beings. The fear of insecurity,which manifests itself at the individual or group level, can also be projected to institutions and corporate entities, countries and regional blocks.

Over the last two decades security has become the foremost concern, and at times, has been the preoccupation of citizens especially in urban settings. Thus, physical and property security are critical in ensuring sustained human and economic development.

This “new security reality” has led to calls by civil society for an urgent re-appraisal of security at all levels to ensure that the rule of law, which is the most robust prerequisite for sustained human, social and economic development is upheld.
As advertised, the Government of Guyana has undertaken to establish a modern forensic laboratory to be housed at the University of Guyana Turkeyen Campus. A new intelligence organization is to be located in the Castellani House compound, and a modern police training college at Eve Leary; while the installation of Open Street Surveillance Cameras in designated public places has begun, as part of the conceptual framework  for the modernisation of public safety in Guyana.
To date, there has not been much consultation or public information with respect to exactly what model of CCTV deployment the Government of Guyana intends to pursue. While some figures have been provided, the general public, which is still to come to grips with the operational modalities of this new gizmo, can only guess as to the true implications of CCTV and how it will impact negatively or positively upon their lives.
The fact that Public Safety is by definition  a stereotypical “public good”, which is unrivalled in society, it cannot be traded efficiently in competitive markets. This is why public safety is primarily provided by the government and financed through taxation. However, even then, the government cannot pay for public safety out of its own pocket, and projects such as the introduction of Open Street Surveillance Cameras, which are very expensive to maintain, needs to be supplemented in some form or fashion in order to remain operable.
The Nigerian government’s inability to sustain its CCTV programme is but one case in point.
John and Maguire defined surveillance as a wide range of methods of monitoring the behaviour, lifestyles or property of suspected or potential offenders –not just visual and optical– but aural, olfactory and electronic (John and Maguire 1998:42). In this context, the surveillance gadget is a “technology” defined in the New Oxford English Dictionary as “the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes.”
Over the past 25 years, a substantial expansion of electronic surveillance systems has occurred on a global scale. However, it is in developing countries where this increase has been most substantial; especially in the private security arena, but not exclusively (Lee, 2004; Newburn & Jones,1998; Sanders, 2005).
The surveillance technology that are used range from metal detectors, scanners, and iris recognition scanners to closed-circuit television (CCTV) and various surveillance systems such as detection, access control and biometric equipment.
Most of these were developed for the military during the middle of the 1940s under the context of “national security programmes” established during the cold war (Casella,2003).
The theory under which CCTV aims to reduce crime is based upon the following assumptions:
1. Deterrence: The potential offender becomes aware of the presence of CCTV, assesses the risks of offending in this location to outweigh the benefits and chooses either not to offend, or to offend elsewhere.
2. Efficient deployment: CCTV cameras allow those monitoring the scene to determine whether police assistance is required. This ensures that police resources are called upon only when necessary.
3. Self-discipline by potential victims: They are reminded of the “risk” of crime, therefore altering their behaviour accordingly. By potential offenders:  Through a process similar to that described by Foucault in his discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon, the threat of potential surveillance ( whether the cameras are actually being monitored may be irrelevant) acts to produce a self-discipline in which individuals police their own behaviour.
4. Presence of a capable guardian: The Routine Activity Theory suggests that for a crime to be committed there must be a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Any act that prevents the convergence of these elements will reduce the likelihood of a crime taking place. CCTV, as a capable guardian, may help to reduce crime.
5. Detection: CCTV cameras capture images of offences taking place. In some cases this may lead to punishment and the removal of the offenders’ ability to offend (either due to incarceration, or increased monitoring and supervision). This assumption is upheld by the detection, apprehension and successful prosecution of several high-profile criminals following the introduction of CCTV.
Notwithstanding, many  studies conducted in developed countries have shown that the introduction of Open Street Surveillance Cameras have  received mixed reviews, another way of saying that the benefits derived do not necessarily justify their huge installation and maintenance costs. These studies have been conducted primarily in European countries, Australia and New Zealand. Before a parallel is drawn between the deployment of CCTV in developing countries and those referred to above, one should first become acquainted with their specific philosophical, historical and socio-political antecedents’.
The decision to implement CCTV in European countries is driven by crime prevention considerations (only). Thus, CCTV crime prevention schemes in most European countries are financed by the government or municipal authorities. Whereas in Brazil, for example, the decision to implement CCTV is born out of the three constitutional documents of Brazil, thus CCTV in the Brazilian context is viewed as a constitutional instrument.
India and Kenya have recently paved the way in their respective  legislatures to allow for the installation of Public CCTVs.
China has announced its intention to unveil the largest “big brother network” of CCTVs in the world. The Chinese government will spend 2.6 billion pounds to install a network of 500,000 surveillance cameras, which will commence in 2012.
Like India, the driving force behind the Chinese scheme is the suppression of civil and religious unrest; while in India the prevention of terrorism is the primary focus of the scheme. However, crime and the monitoring and delivery of emergency services are reported spin-off benefits of both projects. It would seem that most developing countries have found it prudent to develop a model of CCTV deployment which takes into account their specific circumstances. Following the lead of South Africa, which has since developed several CCTV protocols and best practices, to the point of now owning a patent for a modern South African  deployment model, the first of its kind to become ISO certified.
This view finds great resonance in the literature on Brazil, Nigeria and Mexico, where the schemes have been financed primarily through government or municipal financing and, as such, were limited by fiscal constraints.
Of all the countries under review, South Africa has done the most research and has contributed the most to the body of literature on CCTV deployment.
In fact, CCTV deployment is greatest in that country, given the size of its population, though it accounts for one-third of all new electronic equipment purchased on the Indian security market as of late.
In conclusion, the following observations have been made by the British with regard to CCTV schemes, and they should know, since that country has the most CCTV cameras in the world: one for every 32 citizens. The cost of CCTV as a crime prevention measure includes not only the initial investment, but also the ongoing maintenance and running costs. For this reason, any cost effectiveness analysis (or part of a post-installation evaluation or a pre-installation feasibility study) must account for these factors, in particular the staff time required to monitor the cameras and training cost.
Discriminatory monitoring: It was found in the U.K that CCTV civilian operators have been found to adopt police categories of suspicion when viewing the screens. The target selection criterion of CCTV operators can be massively discriminatory towards males, particularly black males. For literally thousands of black and working class youths, however law abiding, it transmits a wholly negative message about their position in society. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report places a particular emphasis upon the use of training to deliver “racism awareness” and valuing cultural diversity.
When the South African trial scheme was first introduced in four metropolitan areas, the operators learnt from their counterparts that it has been suggested that crime prevention initiatives like CCTV follow a finite ‘life cycle’ and for this reason they must be closely monitored to ensure that successes are maintained. It was found in most studies of CCTV that some offence categories showed the most significant reductions after the cameras had been installed but before they actually became operational, suggesting deterrence, as opposed to detection, effect.
South Africa has the most unique scheme, born mainly out of socio-economic considerations. There the introduction of CCTV has gone through several transformations by way of trial and error. Today, the public CCTV schemes have many more stakeholders and clients than those in other developed countries. These include the licences department, municipalities, police, traffic, telephone, electrical, ambulance services, businesses and the like; all of whom contribute to the maintenance of the schemes.
The South Africans have tapped into their highly trained work force and have since addressed problems associated with poor video footage, which makes it impossible to be tendered in a court of law and a common problem worldwide, installation problems which often result in poor video quality, privacy and human rights concerns. The problems are associated with poor outdoor public lighting, which affects video quality and is bound to be a major concern in Guyana.
Public obstacles, which in the case of Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa have obscured the visions of 45 percent of all open street CCTV cameras, thus rendering them ineffective. And problems created by the use of facial recognition software imported from developed countries using Caucasoid facial composition for use in a mainly African-dominated environment have since been addressed.
The South Africans have enlisted the services of Dr Craig Donald, a renowned human factor specialist in security and CCTV deployment, to address issues associated with the training of operators, the construction of ergonomically sound control rooms, which take into consideration such factors as high camera to operator ratio, a constant source of concern, frustration and cause of poor CCTV monitoring by operators who work under constant stress.
It is this author’s view that given the body of literature available on the various CCTV deployment schemes, a model which seeks to integrate the delivery of several services to the citizenry, such as that which currently exists in South Africa, might best serve the needs of Guyana. Perhaps my only other concern could be summarized in the words of Richard Escalante, who said “the transfer of surveillance systems to developing countries can aid national security interest, or risk becoming technologies of political control.”