Pull Quote: “The PNCR may very well perceive the ‘shell’ coalition as a tactical electoral move to rouse emotional sensitivity toward the age-old,worn-out,and irrelevant political rhetoric of national unity.
“At any rate,the PNCR’s ‘shell’coalition is not a strategic move,and the PNCR coalition would need something more than its charade with national unity to becoming not an “also ran in the 2011 election.”You see history and time are not on the PNCR’s side;
The PNCR has never won an election in this country. And now with APNU,there is no PNCR come election 2011.”
VERY SOON, Guyana will hold its national elections within the context of a representative democracy, whereby political parties will compete with each other vis-а-vis their candidates, and perhaps, even with independents. This is a far cry from Guyana being a dictatorship. And voters are not naпve, for they know that democracy goes well beyond the ballot box. And in this election season, too, there is a view that Dr. Walter Rodney’s name should not enter the fray of critical politics that cast aspersions on the Working People’s Alliance’s (WPA) hook-up with the People’s National Congress Reform (PNCR).
Nonetheless, the issue is not the notion nor the reality that this alliance has struck; the issue has more to do with what policies the WPA intends to flag and how these policies would gel with those of the PNCR and its other confederates, and vice versa, too. This line is much more than the platforms enshrined within a manifesto.
And indeed, judging from the methods in Rodney’s academic writings and his people-oriented modus operandi, it is clear that upfront, Rodney would provide public disclosure on the WPA’s policy lines and their interactions with others’ policies in any pursuit of electoral partnerships. The WPA, and indeed, no component of the PNCR coalition so far has provided any such public disclosure on the coalition’s policy interactions; and this political behaviour borders on gross discourtesy to Guyanese voters.
I should also add that the WPA has no monopoly and ownership rights on Rodney. Undoubtedly, the WPA’s few existing members seem to be experiencing political insecurity, when other people/parties brandish the Walter Rodney name. This behaviour is not surprising, as without the Rodney trademark, there is no WPA. Furthermore, the WPA has no constituency base, and since the Rodney assassination, the WPA’s attractiveness as a political party remains a zero score.
And those WPA few who believe that some people are dishonouring the Rodney name because they criticize the WPA’s marriage of convenience with the PNCR, are naпve politically because these remaining few in the WPA should have anticipated that kind of critical remark vis-а-vis the alleged PNCR assassination of Rodney; and those in the WPA attributing ‘dishonour’ to other people’s criticisms of this WPA-PNCR alliance, are themselves dishonouring the Rodney name, because instead of sustaining the glory and tradition of the WPA, they continue to destroy the last vestiges of the WPA’s political and electoral credibility. And the Rodney name is further dishonoured, given that the PNCR coalition is a ‘shell, of which the WPA is a proud member. Indeed, the WPA itself is a ‘shell’.
Still on this PNCR ‘shell’ coalition, last week I pointed out that the PNCR coalition would seek to have a minimum connected winnable coalition; where the PNCR would aspire toward a ‘winnable’ situation.
Riker (1962) argued that people seeking electoral office have as their main interest the benefits of that office; and for that reason, the PNCR coalition game would seek out a minimum winning coalition. Clearly, if in government, and there is no probable chance of this happening, the PNCR would not want a situation whereby the abandonment of one coalition partner results in its government’s demise, and therefore, totally lose out on the benefits of office.
Accordingly then, continuing with this improbability, the PNCR’s best shot would be to have ‘shell’ coalition partners with very few legislators, and even better still, for the PNCR to win over these legislators on election day or soon thereafter. In this way, the PNCR would not be vulnerable to its coalition partners.
What these things mean for the dominant PNCR coalition partner is the construction and reconstruction of heightened coalition conflict as the drama of election day draws nigh and thereafter. And indeed, this intensified conflict gets worse if not effectively managed, especially in this country where there is no tradition of a party striving for a minimum connected winnable coalition. And if the conflict does get worse, what would happen to the PNCR coalition’s trademark of national unity, which seems to be the brand name for its election campaign?
In coalition politics prior to government formation, applying Baron and Diermeier’s ideas (2001), partners tend to secure pledges for benefits from the office as well as benefits flowing from governmental policies. Generally, there is some haggling over who gets what from the office and from policy discharge. And then, indeed, there are those who also feel that receiving office benefits mean that they have the right to policy benefits as well.
For these reasons, within the context of coalition politics, Guyanese voters would want to know upfront how the Brigadier, or more realistically, the PNCR, would distribute these spoils of policy and office even in a general sense, should the huge improbability of winning occurs; and also what happens when there is no compromise on pledges for benefits prior to election and subsequently.
The implication here is not that voters need to know upfront the distribution of cabinet portfolios, etc., but voters need to have a sense of the general policy interactions, not mere policy directions, among coalition stakeholders, and a general sense of the distribution of the spoils; voters would want to have a sense of these disclosures, however general they may be at this time, before they cast their votes. For all you know, the PNCR is not enamored with this ‘shell’ coalition.
The PNCR may very well perceive the ‘shell’ coalition as a tactical electoral move to rouse emotional sensitivity toward the age-old, worn-out, and irrelevant political rhetoric of national unity.
At any rate, the PNCR’s ‘shell’ coalition is not a strategic move, and the PNCR coalition would need something more than its charade with national unity to becoming not an “also ran in the 2011 election”. You see history and time are not on the PNCR’s side; the PNCR has never won an election in this country. And now with APNU, there is no PNCR come election 2011.