From GDF mismanagement to a ‘shell’ coalition
EVERY five years around election time, there is the usual predictable opposition chatter of forming a grand coalition to remove the People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) Administration. This political chatter has become the ‘soup’ of the day. As the opposition elements remain marooned in the political wilderness for 19 years, their desperation to taste political power is peaking.  Nonetheless, the masses see no comprehensive policy plans from the individual opposition party; what the masses see and hear are sound bites. It would be more than interesting to take a peek at their coalition policy plans, should a coalition emerge.

And no characteristic as a grand coalition has ever left any indelible imprint on Guyana’s political landscape, and at least, since 1992, there was never any coalition building of substance.

And today, the empty dream of a grand coalition still is an obsession for the politically naпve. The repeated drum roll for this grand coalition is some kind of call for national unity. And yet when these oppositionists institute their confab, each person wants to be the presidential candidate; clearly, then with such thinking, a lack of trust becomes a prevalent feature at such meetings; and in this confab, too, where all want to be presidential candidates, no one will be the presidential candidate; therefore, the outcome of the confab will be a zero coalition.

At this time, the People’s National Congress Reform (PNCR) presidential candidate Brigadier David Granger forges ahead in negotiations with something of a coalition called the Joint Opposition Political Parties (JOPP), in order to achieve some tangibles in time for the PNCR’s General Council of May 21, 2011.

And even if Granger succeeds in extracting some tangibles from the current ‘coalition’ discussions, their electoral utility would be zero; except the PNCR, each partner within the aspiring coalition, that is, the Working People’s Alliance (WPA), the Guyana Action Party (GAP), and the National Front Alliance (NFA) has no solid constituency. And even if these four coalition aspirants hold together in the next few days, clearly, the Brigadier will emerge as coalition leader. That certainly will not be breaking news, as the aspiring coalition minus the PNCR really is a shell. In fact, should the coalition happen, then it is the PNCR that would really be the coalition. These small political aspirants also present an unpersuasive voting record.

The WPA received 6,086 votes in 1992, declining to 4,783 votes in 1997; the WPA teamed up with GAP in the 2001 national elections to receive only 9,451 votes. GAP coalesced with ROAR in the 2006 national elections where they received only 4,588 votes. The NFA (assuming it is the same as the current NFA) received 417 votes in the 2001 national elections.

Furthermore, at  this point where Guyana is months before its national election, if the PNCR is serious about establishing a credible coalition movement, and it can only secure the services of ‘also ran’ political groupings which, together, really is a shell, then the PNCR has convincingly evolved into a weakened political force. This tкte-а-tкte with small shell parties, clearly, demonstrates that the PNCR is not enamoured with the wherewithal to win the next election, with or without the ‘shell’ coalition.

Some time ago, I noted: “Exuberance and ecstasy over coalition building are playing havoc with people’s minds here in Guyana, in light of the recently-installed coalition executives in Great Britain, Trinidad & Tobago, and Suriname (pending), producing a pregnant thinking that a grand coalition is the answer to the PPP/C in the 2011 national election.

Could this thinking be a fad and foible? Even so, why should these people not be euphoric? Some of them are now inhabitants of the political wilderness over the last 17 years. Nonetheless, we can argue until doomsday as to what motivates coalition formation. The fact of the matter is that coalitions are linked to office seeking, the idea of wanting to govern, and this is what it is all about, after we shed the crude rhetoric from the arguments.”

And attempting to conclude a flimsy coalition arrangement with ‘shell’ political groupings would hardly be considered a good reference for the Brigadier’s leadership capacity. Along with his political office-seeking quest, Brigadier Granger’s quality of governance is highly questionable.

Professor Chaitram Singh noted in the Journal of Third World Studies that “Frustration became endemic in the army. Officers began to emmigrate to the United States and Canada. While many resigned their commissions and then emmigrated, others simply absconded while attending courses overseas. Some of those who remained in the GDF attempted to enrich themselves by a variety of means.

Misappropriation of funds became a common offence among officers. In these cases, court martials were avoided because of a reluctance to draw adverse publicity on the GDF. In some cases, the officers were simply made to repay the money.

In other cases, the officers were forced to resign from the army. Use of army personnel and equipment for private projects was common among officers. Still others were involved in contraband trade with neighbouring Suriname.

In 1985, for example, a lieutenant colonel was arrested and imprisoned at the Camp Street prison for his involvement in the smuggling of contraband goods from Suriname.” Corruption in the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) reached endemic proportions. 

This was the period of the 1980s under Brigadier Granger’s watch; keep in mind that Granger was GDF Commander between 1979 and 1990. Most times, presidential leadership has to do with policy leadership which entails an enormous amount of coalition building.

The Brigadier brings to the table security credentials as his signature tune; well, there were significant problems with his leadership of the GDF vis-а-vis the lack of policies to address GDF corruption, frustration, depletion of budgetary resources, among other things.

PULL QUOTE:
As the opposition elements remain marooned in the political wilderness for 19 years, their desperation to taste political power is peaking.  Nonetheless, the masses see no comprehensive policy plans from the individual opposition party; what the masses see and hear are sound bites. It would be more than interesting to take a peek at their coalition policy plans, should a coalition emerge.