The Ethnic Security Dilemma
Part 5
PART 1 examined reasons for racial problems in multiethnic societies with a colonial experience, and whether such problems emanate from genetic makeup. Part 2 focused on how ethnic conflict happens. Part 3 deliberated on the issue of ethnic dominance vis-à-vis class status. Part 4 looked at the issue of ethnic security vis-à-vis its history as an aspect of race relations in national development. In Part 4, too, I noted that the issue of ethnic security between Indians and Africans arose when the White traditional political authority dissipated. The White political authority was the neutral mediating force between Africans and Indians during imperialist rule.

Nonetheless, the White exit created a political vacuum for which mainly Indians and Africans engaged in a power competition. This situation provided the ingredients for the ethnic security dilemma that obtained reinforcement and prominence in the post-Independence era.

In the early post-Independence years, this interethnic power competition engineered uncertainty and fear, producing a consequential increase in incremental power for both major ethnic groups, where both groups possibly had no malign intention toward each other.

Nevertheless, both groups’ accumulation of political power induced perceptions that one side was dominant against the other; and this situation is an expression of the Indian and African ethnic security dilemma.

Today, drawing from the literature on ethnic security dilemma and conflict, I want to show how a person may recognize the ethnic security dilemma vis-à-vis three concepts (Tang 2011): (1) anarchy producing uncertainty, fear, and developing self-help for security purposes, (2) no malign intention on all sides, and (3) increase of power. All three aspects are necessary to establish that a security dilemma exists; absence of any one aspect means that no security dilemma prevails.

Now, how does the ethnic security dilemma happen among ethnics? Anarchy produces
uncertainty, uncertainty creates fear, fear generates power competition among the different ethnics involved, power competition leads to the ethnic security dilemma, and the activated ethnic security dilemma runs into conflict (Tang 2011).

The top section of Figure 1 shows the causes of ethnic security dilemma, and the bottom part shows the outcomes of ethnic security dilemma. The middle part shows the physical and psychological influences on the ethnic security dilemma; these influences are different from the causes of ethnic security dilemma (anarchy creating uncertainty and fear, no malign intention, and power competition). Toward the bottom, we see that the security dilemma can spiral to ethnic conflict.

An example of an influencing factor is ‘misperceptions’; if this influence creates a conflict situation, it does not mean that that conflict situation is a security dilemma. Hence, that influencing factor merely influences the security dilemma, but it does not create or sustain the dilemma (Tang 2011).

We should note, too, other factors that induce ethnic conflict. There are psychological factors that generate ethnic conflict, and these are fear, hatred, resentment, and rage (Petersen 2008); we should note as well that geography (Toft 2005), conflict of economic interests (Tang 1995), and the prevalence of allies (Snyder 1984) are other contributory factors to ethnic conflict; then we have Byman (2002) who suggested four independent theories of ethnic conflict: ethnic security dilemma, status concern, hegemonic ambition, and aspirations of elites.

Nonetheless, these factors on their own cannot satisfactorily explain ethnic conflict; and the general tendency in some multiethnic societies is to explain ethnic conflict using these factors, individually; Tang (2011) believes that we can integrate the security dilemma/spiral framework, subsuming all these factors, to understand ethnic conflict; in this integrative approach, we have to focus on intra-ethnic politics and inter-ethnic politics, where each group has an elite and a mass; and for this reason, a critical factor in understanding ethnic conflict is the active relationship between the elite and the mass, and these two are not necessarily united.

We could have an ethnic security dilemma situation, a precursor to ethnic conflict, where there may be a minority but ethnically dominant group that pushes to sustain its hegemony, and on the other side of the fence, we could have a majority but deprived group that demands equal rights or even desires hegemony (Tang 2011).

In this situation, elites from both ethnic groups may seek benefits, either for their personal use, or for their group’s advantage; at any rate, these dynamics being unstable could induce ethnic conflict. An understanding of ethnic conflict requires an understanding of intragroup politics, involving elite and mass, and intergroup dynamics (Tang 2011).

Elite in Group B
United (aggressive)    United (moderate)    Split
United (aggressive)    Conflict is almost inevitable (I)    Conflict very likely (II)    Conflict very likely
(III)
United (moderate)    Conflict very likely (II)    Peaceful resolution very likely (IV)    Peaceful resolution more likely (V)
Split    Conflict very likely (III)    Peaceful resolution more likely (V)    Both conflict and peace are possible (VI)

Elite in Group A
Here are the interpretations from Figure 2 (Tang 2011). Elites from both groups have a lot to do with whether there will be conflict or peace. Chances for conflict are very probable where elites in both groups have hostile intention (Cell I). Chances for better relations are likely where elites in both groups are united and moderate (Cell IV); chances for conflict are probable where one elite group is aggressive and the other may be moderate or split (Cells I, II, and III).

What could happen with the security dilemma and conflict, either, when both elites and the mass in one group are united with each other, or, when they are hostile to each other within that same group?

And what could happen with the security dilemma and conflict when both elites and the mass in one group are united with the elites and mass in the other group, and indeed, when the elites and masses are hostile to each other in both groups?

Applying Tang’s work (2011) to the Guyana scene, while elites have a huge role in reducing ethnic security dilemma and conflict, we must find out, too, what role the masses play in this process. Can the masses be just followers of the elite leaders, or can the masses themselves on their own also play a huge role in reducing ethnic conflict?

What benefits do elite leaders obtain when they accentuate the ethnic security dilemma and/or conflict? What contribution do elite leaders play in ethnic security and conflict management? And do we have exclusion of the masses in this ethnic security and conflict management role?

PULL QUOTE:
Now, how does the ethnic security dilemma happen among ethnics? Anarchy produces
uncertainty, uncertainty creates fear, fear generates power competition among the different ethnics involved, power competition leads to the ethnic security dilemma, and the activated ethnic security dilemma runs into conflict (Tang 2011).