PART ONE examined reasons for racial problems in multiethnic societies with a colonial experience; and whether such problems emanate as a result of genetic makeup. Generally, people are not born with the capacity for ethnic conflict; people’s genetic makeup has little or nothing to do with ethnic conflict. Well, then, how does ethnic conflict happen? Prior to mulling this caveat, however, we should first find out about the extent of ethnic conflict in a multiethnic society? Marger (1997) feels that we can find answers to this question vis-à-vis addressing four other questions; and let us do so within the Guyana context.

1.    How do the ethnic groups communicate with each other? Do they embrace principles of accommodation, cooperation, conflict, hostility, and violence?
2.    How do we rank ethnic groups? We should know which ethnic groups receive different treatment and obtain unequal amounts of valued resources, such as, wealth, prestige, and power; these impact education, occupation, and income; which are the three indicators that measure a person’s socioeconomic status (SES).
3.    Do we have a dominant ethnic group in Guyana?  What are the methods used by the dominant ethnic group(s) to maintain its position at the top of the political and ethnic hierarchy?  If there is a dominant ethnic group, does it use prejudice and discrimination to sustain its power interests?
4.    What are the long-term outcomes of relations among these ethnic groups?  Consider whether ethnic groups are moving toward pluralism, or assimilation, or combinations of these.

Quote: ‘Clearly, within the Guyana context, there are elements in the political sphere and mass media that ubiquitously present a non-evidence-based view of race relations; and then call for new political arrangements to eliminate the wrongs. It’s as if these elements create a stage play where they write the script and hope and pray that the masses would use it effectively…’

Based on the responses to these questions, Guyana, as a multiethnic society, has deep ethnic divisions if it embodies characteristics of hostility and violence; unequal and different treatment; prejudice and discrimination; and assimilation and/or cultural genocide. Alternatively, Guyana, as a multiethnic society, does not have deep ethnic divisions if it typifies cooperation and accommodation; relatively similar treatment; minimum ethnic inequality; and pluralism. Answers to the four questions will determine the extent of ethnic conflict in the Guyana society. Nonetheless, we still need to know how ethnic conflict happens, and this is the intent of today’s Perspectives.
People themselves engineer ethnic conflict for their own ends as we saw in the Rwanda genocide; hence, people construct ethnic conflict to further their own vested interests. Who benefits from ethnic conflict? Clearly, the beneficiaries would be people who promote and realize their vested interests.
People define their own reality. Once people come to terms with this definition, they begin to live within this reality. Nevertheless, the individual in contact with others, either face-to-face, or through other forms of communication, shape this reality. Remarks and messages by politicians, the mass media, hate literature, and significant others, do influence the formation of people’s reality.

Some of these typical messages in Guyana include: Social inequality drives the Guyanese way of life; public leadership constantly pursues the initiation and strengthening of ethnic dominance; ethnic groups see each other as racially unequal; ethnic marginalization is a key public policy measure; ownership and control of the wealth of this country lies in the hands of particular ethnic groups; religious persuasions promote a racist ideology; ethnic groups will be better off with their own ethnic kind driving political and corporate governance.

Television stations and the print media regurgitate these messages daily, and in principle they should, in the interest of freedom of speech. Nonetheless, at least the mass media should not disseminate messages, if untrue and unfair, as if they were legitimate.

Some elements within the mass media and political sphere may believe that these messages represent the true picture in Guyana. For this reason, it is plausible that people may accept these messages, notwithstanding that the messages for them may produce false perceptions and a reality overflowing with untruths. Even so, regardless of the veracity or falsity of the perceptions, so long as people believe these perceptions to be true, such perceptions will drive their behaviours.

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that false perceptions, once accepted, constitute the individual’s reality and that individual behaves in accordance with those false beliefs; likewise, true perceptions constitute the individual’s reality and that individual behaves in accordance with those true beliefs; and this is how the social construction of reality starts; and in our Perspectives today, how the social construction of ethnic conflict begins.

Moreover, the Thomas Theorem amply demonstrates the construction process, thus: “If people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” The social construction of reality, therefore, tells us how people shape their behaviours and, indeed, ethnic conflict through contact with others.

We can say that people talk about the messages to which I earlier alluded, and, of course, there are other messages, to form an opinion of race relations in Guyana. And any artificial understanding (non-evidence-based) of race relations would obscure an appreciation of the factual scenario; alternatively, any sincere understanding (evidence-based) of race relations would produce an appreciation of the factual scenario.

Clearly, within the Guyana context, there are elements in the political sphere and mass media that ubiquitously present a non-evidence-based view of race relations; and then call for new political arrangements to eliminate the wrongs. It’s as if these elements create a stage play where they write the script and hope and pray that the masses would use it effectively. Why?

In the first place, elements in the political sphere and the mass media fashion this artificial realty for the masses, and that, in turn, enables them to use the ethnic and race card to further their political advantage. Applying the race and ethnic card makes some politicians relevant in Guyana’s politics. Indeed, there, also, are elements within the political sphere and mass media that ubiquitously present an evidence-based view of race relations.

The efficacy of this view that ethnic conflict is socially constructed will vary with whether people use the evidence-based or non-evidence-based approach as the paradigm. That is to say the more the view tends toward evidence-based perceptions, the more the acceptance of the social construction of ethnic conflict; the more the view tends toward non-evidence-based perceptions, the more the rejection of the social construction of ethnic conflict.

Let me end Part Two with an excerpt from Part One: “Keane’s description is about the Rwanda genocide of 1994 which culminated in the massacre of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in fewer than 100 days. Professor Thompson (Pluto Press 2007) noted that the radio and print media became a tool of hate, where they egged on neighbours to hate and hurt each other; these were the notorious radio broadcasts that fanned the flames of hatred. Keane suggested that these racial problems may be socially constructed.”

*Misir, Prem. 2006. The Social Construction of Race-Ethnic Conflict in Guyana. Lanham, MD: University Press of America of the Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.