-awards him damages for wrongful imprisonment
JOSEPH Rudolph Spencer ‘Rudy’ Luck, a practising Barrister-at-law, was on April 15, 1954 convicted by Magistrate Richard Guy Sharples on a charge of disorderly behaviour. But the magistrate invoked the provisions of Section 42 (b) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Procedure) Ordinance, Chapter 4, and ordered Luck to be discharged conditionally on his giving  security in the sum of $100, with one surety in a like sum to the satisfaction of the Respondent to appear for sentence when called upon within six months.
Luck then intimated to the Respondent that he would not be signing the bond, and later left the court.
On April 27, 1954, the Respondent caused to be served on Luck a document purporting to be an Order made by him on April 15, 1954.  By the purported Order, Luck was required to enter into a recognizance  within 10 days  of the date of the Order,  and upon failure to obey the Order,  it was adjudged that for his disobedience, he be imprisoned for two months  unless and until he had remedied his default by disobedience to the said Order.
On May 3, 1954, Luck, having not complied with the terms of the Order, was taken into custody under a commitment warrant  issued by the Respondent  and was conveyed to the Georgetown Prison.  
There he was detained from May 3 to May 29, 1954, on which latter date he was, by Order of the Acting Chief Justice, released from custody upon signing a recognizance to appear before him  on  May 31, 1954.   On June 3, 1954, the Acting Chief Justice discharged Luck and quashed the warrant of commitment.
On June 19, 1954 , on the return of a writ of certiorari granted on June 12, 1954 , it was ordered that the Respondent’ s  Order  of April 15, 1954, be quashed.   Thereafter, on July 24, 1954, Luck gave notice to the respondent his intention to bring an action against him claiming $50, 000 in damages for false imprisonment, which was subsequently dismissed.
Then trial judge held that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to make the Order, but that Luck   did not appeal against the Order, as he could not  by virtue of Section 3 of the Justices Protection Ordinance, Chapter 254 (Major Edition of the Laws) bring an action against the Respondent in respect of the period of imprisonment undergone by him and flowing from the Order as that Order had not been quashed on appeal.
The West Indian Court of Appeal (WICA) went on to point out that under Section 3 of Chapter 254: “No action shall be brought for anything done (a) under the conviction or order until after it has been quashed.”
On appeal against the trial judge’s decision, WICA held that:
(i)The respondent had no jurisdiction to make the Order;
(ii)The Order made by the magistrate on April 15, 1954 was in no sense a final adjudication in a cause or matter,  and was therefore not  a decision  as contemplated by Section 3  of the Summary Jurisdiction (Appeals) Ordinance, Chapter 16 (Major Edition). The Order could not therefore be quashed on appeal; and
(iii)The Order was the source from which the appellant‘s imprisonment flowed, and the appellant had taken the proper legal steps, an appeal not being open to him to have it quashed by certiorari.    
Mr. L.F.S. Burnham appeared for the appellant, while Mr. G.M. Farnum,  then Acting Attorney General (with F.W.H. Ramsahoye) held for the respondent.
WICA, constituted by Mathieu-Perez, Jackson and Chenery, C.J.J., said in its judgment, inter alia: “It was submitted by Mr. Burnham, counsel for the Appellant (Luck), that in this document,  the words from ‘within 10 days’ to the words ‘the said order’ at the end of the document represent  an addition to the  oral Order the Respondent  made on 15th April 1954 at the Georgetown Magistrate’s Court. 
“This was an issue before the trial judge, who found that the Order as served was in terms of the oral Order pronounced.  It was urged that the only evidence on this point was to the contrary, that adduced by the Appellant himself.  It is indeed true that the Order was in evidence, but it was only put in to show the source that gave rise to the warrant of commitment.
“Before us, counsel for the Respondent  did not contest this issue, and the balance of probability inclines to support  the Appellant’s contention.   We find in favour  of the view contended for  by the Appellant, and are of the opinion that that part of the Order  was made in the Appellant’s absence  and after the adjournment when the Appellant  had already left the Court.
“On 3rd May, the Respondent issued a Warrant  of  Commitment,  commanding Frederick Cannon, Supt. of Police, to take and  convey the Appellant  to the Georgetown Prison and the Keeper of  the Prison to receive the Appellant  and keep him to hard labour for a term of two months.  On the said 3rd of May, 1954 , Supt. Cannon,  in consequence,  arrested the Appellant  and delivered him to the Keeper of the Prison, where the Appellant was detained  and kept from 3rd of May to 29th of May, 1954.
“On the later date, the Appellant was, by Order of the Acting Chief Justice, released  from custody  upon his signing a recognizance to appear before him, the said  Acting  Chief Justice, on Monday, 31st May. 
“On 3rd June, 1954, the Acting Chief Justice discharged the Appellant  and quashed  the Warrant of Commitment.   On 19th June, 1954, on the return to a writ of certiorari granted on 12th June 1954 , it was ordered  that the Order of 15th April, 1954 be quashed.
“Thereafter,  on 24th July, 1954, the Appellant gave notice to the Respondent of his  intention to bring an action against him, the  said Magistrate, respondent,  claiming $50, 000 damages for false imprisonment.   That action was heard  by Clare J.,   who gave judgment  for  the Respondent/Defendant  with costs.   From that decision, the Appellant has appealed.
“We are of the opinion that the magistrate  had no jurisdiction to make the Order.  It might have been thought  that the judge, having so clearly disposed of the main question in issue, would have  proceeded  to find for the Appellant  and award  him such damages as he  thought fit  and proper .
“The Judge, however,  took the view that inasmuch  as the Appellant  did not appeal, and holding quite  correctly  that the writs of Habeas Corpus and  Certiorari did not take the place of an appeal, he reached the conclusion that as the proviso to Section 3 of Chapter 254 states ‘no action shall be brought for anything done (a) under the conviction or order until after it has been quashed,’ that the action was ‘for something done  under the conviction  which was still in full  force  and effect not having been quashed on appeal.’”
Allowing the appeal, WICA added in its judgment: “The appellant has had his liberty restricted; as a result, his reputation has suffered; he is entitled to damages, which should be adequate compensation for this; for the injury to his dignity, and for the discomfort he injured.
“The damage ensues until the determination of this case, and it may be mentioned that at no time did the magistrate have, even on the original charge , any power to order  peremptory imprisonment.
“We are not unmindful of the conduct of the Appellant before the magistrate, but however unfavourable a view we may take of such conduct,  that would not disentitle him to damages.
“In all the circumstances, we think than an award of $50.000 would be adequate.
“The appeal is allowed, with costs, and the judgment and order of the court below reversed. There shall be entered judgment for the Appellant plaintiff on the claim for the sum of $50.000 with costs.  Appeal allowed.”