– has no locus standi in such proceedings 
ON September 1, 1959, the Georgetown Town Council issued a summons in the magistrate’s court against one Insanally for unlawfully extending his building,  and was granted a mandatory injunction to pull down the offending construction for committing acts of nuisance.
A High Court judge also granted the declaration and an injunction restraining the appellant from making further alterations or additions.
On appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, constituted by Chief Justice Hallinan, and Justices Lewis and Marnan,  the appeal was allowed and that court held that the Town Council  had no locus standi in proceedings of an injunction,  the Attorney General being the proper plaintiff.
The appeal was allowed, and the Council was ordered to pay costs to the appellant.
Dr. Fenton Ramsahoye and Mr. Clarence Hughes, S.C., appeared for the appellant, while Mr. C. Lloyd Luckhoo, S.C., and Mr. S. Rahaman held for the respondent.
The facts of the case disclosed that the appellant extended one side of a building on his premises, thereby increasing the authorised area. The respondent, the Town Clerk of Georgetown, acting for the Town Council of Georgetown,   claimed a declaration that the appellant  had, by altering and adding to the building, committed acts of nuisance and was in breach of the Public Health Ordinance, Chapter 145  (B.G.), and of By-Laws made under the Georgetown  Town Council Ordinance, Chapter 152 (B.G.).     The Court granted the declaration, and an injunction restraining the appellant  from making further alterations or additions.
The Federal Supreme Court held:  (i)  There was no evidence of nuisance  and a declaration that the appellant  had committed a  criminal offence was a wrong exercise of  the court’s  jurisdiction;
(ii)   That the respondent  had no locus standi  in proceedings for an injunction,  the Attorney General being the proper plaintiff.
Delivering  the judgment,  Justice Hallinan said: “The Georgetown Town Council on September 1, 1959,  issued  a summons in the magistrate’s court  against the appellant  under Section 186 of the Public Health Ordinance, Chapter 145 (B.G.), for breach  of that Ordinance.
“The Building Inspector had visited the appellant’s premises, lot 9 Camp Street, Newburg, and found that he had extended the building on the northern side by  a structure  8 feet 8 inches by 47 feet 6 inches, so that a building  whose authorised area was 787 square feet had been  increased  by 408 square feet.
“After numerous adjournments   in the Magistrate’s Court, the appellant, during  the absence of the Town Council’s lawyer, succeeded (in circumstances which reflect little credit on the court,  and still less on the appellant)  in amending the summons so that  the area, the subject matter of the offence, was reduced from 408 square feet to a mere area  of some 70 square feet ; whereupon the  appellant quickly pleaded guilty and the Magistrate fined him $10.    “
But even after the case in the magistrate’s court  had ended, Justice Hallinan said, the appellant   continued to extend  his building, and by February 17, 1960, the area of unauthorised building  had revealed 496 square feet. Said he: “The Town Council then launched  the present  proceeding, in the name of the  Town Clerk, claiming a declaration that the appellant had,  by altering and adding to the building , done acts of  nuisance and was  in breach of the Public Health Ordinance  and of the By-laws made under  the Georgetown Town Council Ordinance, Chapter 152, (B.G.). Also, the Town Council claimed a mandatory injunction  that the appellant should  pull down the unauthorized building , and an injunction  to restrain him from doing further alterations or additions
“The Court granted the Town Council the declaration  as claimed,  and also granted  an injunction to restrain the appellant from doing and making  further additions and alterations.
“It can be said at once that the declaration granted by the Court  cannot stand; there  was no evidence of nuisance, and no authority has been cited  to us  where  a declaration was made  in civil proceedings  that the defendant had committed a criminal offence.
“On principle, I am of the opinion that it is a wrong exercise of the court’s jurisdiction  to give a declaratory  judgment of that kind.
“However, had this action been properly constituted, an injunction might have been an appropriate remedy.
“But the main ground of appeal is that the respondent had no locus standi, except at the relation of the Attorney General, who should have been the plaintiff in these proceedings.
“It was submitted that the acts alleged against the appellants did not infringe any right vested in the Town  Council, either under Chapter 145 or either Bye-Law  15, made under Chapter 152.
“The case of Devonport Corpn.  –v- Toser  (4)  is clear authority  in support of this ground of appeal, and I am unable  to distinguish it from the present case.
“In the Devonport  case (4),  the  Corporation  alleged that the defendants  were laying out highways  in ‘new streets’ which did not  comply  with the  borough bye-laws as to width.”
In conclusion of his judgment,  to which the other judges concurred,  Justice Hallinan said: “Obedience to bye-laws,  even as to the construction of a dwelling house, is, I think, a public duty, and disobedience  to  their instructions  is prima facie a public wrong.
“I think the judgment in this case should be set aside and judgment entered for the appellant with costs, here and below.”