DEMOGRAPHIC transition and economic development shifting party loyalties, however temporary, are changing the face of politics in democracies worldwide.
The Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats recently consummated a coalition to form a government in the U.K., as the electoral results were inconclusive. And just a few days ago, right in our own backyard, the five-Party People’s Partnership, inclusive of the United National Congress (UNC) and Congress of the People (COP), a coalition force, constituted the government in Trinidad & Tobago; winning a landslide victory.
Are we, therefore, seeing coalitions as the new in-thing in politics? Nonetheless, this is not surprising, as politics is about controlling power. That is, who gets what, when, how, or in any which way; and for this reason, people’s motivation reaches fever-pitch levels in their quest to revel in political power; politics also is the art of the possible, in that a fair amount of pragmatism becomes a constant requirement on the threshold of power, as well as in the governance process. Hence, these considerations largely would shape the nature of ensuing coalitions.
Not too long ago, I said: “Coalitions, a marriage of convenience, a marriage of expediency, a marriage of power, are all part of the political delicacies of today’s electoral menu. Take your pick. For these odd sorts, pragmatism following inconclusive elections, generally, dictates the constitution of coalitions of all of the above, and maybe others, too; nonetheless, make no mistake about the mostly unplanned nature of the form and content of these coalitions; and we could commit a further error through heralding ‘all of the above’ as planned power sharing; though, indeed, in a latent sense, some ad hoc sharing of this power will ensue vis-à-vis majority/minority stake-holding interests.”
Accordingly, then, what options do we have in determining the form and content of coalitions? Goodin (Australian National University), Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics), and Sausgruber (University of Innsbruck) in the British Journal of Political Science had a mouthful to say about the timing of coalitions.

Quote: ‘The Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats recently consummated a coalition to form a government in the U.K., as the electoral results were inconclusive. And just a few days ago, right in our own backyard, the five-Party People’s Partnership, inclusive of the United National Congress (UNC) and Congress of the People (COP), a coalition force, constituted the government in Trinidad & Tobago; winning a landslide victory’

Since World War II, about 50% of the parties in OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries had set up their coalitions prior to elections; and about 25% went on to form governments. Goodin, Güth, and Sausgruber presented four (4) hypotheses on coalition timing.
These are: (1) Parties will tend to form larger-than-necessary coalitions prior to elections than after elections; those risk-averse parties, due to the uncertainty as to the number of votes each partner would have, would show greater proclivity toward forming a coalition prior to election; and, indeed, if the coalition is set up after an election, then the party will choose a coalition partner with the bare minimum of votes to form the government.
(2) Parties will tend to form coalitions where they have a closeness toward particular policies more frequently prior to than after an election; in the aftermath of an election, there will be considerable haggling and trade-offs of policies, etc; whereas, forming a coalition prior to an election facilitates the parties to make connection with each other on binding ‘policies’.
(3) Notwithstanding that they could win without a coalition, those parties with an interest in coalitions, are more likely to enter into such an arrangement prior to an election; when this happens early, coalition partners comply with some relational contract where they become committed to the cause of government. Nevertheless, the task of setting up coalitions after an election, may involve ‘buying off’ partners whose votes become the real driving force in politics, rather than real policies for the people.
(4) Coalition formation prior to an election encourages and nurtures strategic voting; voters’ knowledge of the consequences of their party choices may better equip them to indulge in strategic voting.

Quote: ‘Parties forming coalitions prior to elections carry greater efficacy than those emerging after an election; and those prior to an election would have better foundational wherewithal to behave as a one-party force; in fact, they are less of a coalition.’

The Conservative/Liberal Democrats Coalition Government in the UK is a coalition that was set up after the election, where the basis of its foundation was trade-offs, carrying little commitment to addressing mainstream issues, other than a rigorous pursuit of parties protecting their own power interests. And there already was talk of a fall election this year, even before the two parties consummated the alliance.
And the People’s Partnership in Trinidad & Tobago consummated their alliance prior to the May 24 election this year; the main partners also engaged in discussions and reached agreement on a joint platform to contest the election. The People’s Partnership won 29 of the 41 seats, a landslide victory. Parties forming coalitions prior to elections carry greater efficacy than those emerging after an election; and those prior to an election would have better foundational wherewithal to behave as a one-party force; in fact, they are less of a coalition.
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