KISSOON Wazar Alli, who allegedly murdered his wife in 1968, was permitted to plead guilty to the lesser count of manslaughter although on the depositions, there was no indication of any circumstance to justify acceptance of such a plea. The trial judge who permitted the plea of manslaughter after the prosecution showed its willingness to accept same, sentenced the accused Alli to 10 years imprisonment.

But Alli, expecting a much lighter sentence, appealed against what he called the severity of sentence.

The Guyana Court of Appeal, constituted by Justices of Appeal, Messrs. E.V. Luckhoo,  Guya Persaud Mr. P.A. Cummings, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the sentence as appropriate.

In the plea in mitigation, defence counsel Mr. Bernard De Santos said inter alia that the appellant had suffered great mental anguish.

The appellant had appealed on the ground that the trial judge had made no allowance in his sentence for the fact that he had pleaded guilty and had not contested any issue before the court.

But the Appellate Court held that:-

(i)                 a plea of guilty  does not necessarily mean that the prisoner genuinely regrets his act;

(ii)               if a sentence appears to be proper and appropriate, it matters not that something was taken into account which ought or ought not to have been;

(iii)             on the facts as appeared in the depositions, there was little, if anything, to mitigate the crime which had been committed, and that in any event, if there was remorse, the judge’s memorandum  of sentence showed that he must have had it in mind;

(iv)             Justice of Appeal Cummings, who concurred with Luckhoo and Persaud, had noted that “the trial judge did not take into account several facts which he ought to have taken cognizance of, including  the plea of guilty  to manslaughter, but in appeal against sentence, the court is called upon to exercise a discretion, and in so doing,  must have regard to all the circumstances.”

At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. J. Gonsalves-Sabola represented  the Crown, while Mr. Bernard De Santos appeared for the accused.   President of the Court, Mr. E.V. Luckhoo, in delivering judgment, observed: “There is an application in this appeal for leave to appeal against sentence, on the ground that the learned trial judge failed to give adequate consideration to the appellant’s plea of guilty to manslaughter.

“He was on a charge of murder when the court, following the Crown’s willingness to accept that plea, permitted this to be done.  The appellant was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment  for what could well be described as a  bestial and dastardly act in stabbing his reputed wife at least twice with a knife, which must have been at least one-and-a-half inches  in  diameter,  in the region of her heart and liver, puncturing the apex of the left ventricle and the lobe of the liver.

“On the depositions, the learned judge, on the authority of  R. v. Soanes, [1948] 32 C. A. R.  136, would have been entitled to refuse to allow the appellant  to plead guilty to manslaughter, because there was no indication  on the deposition that circumstances  existed to justify the acceptance  of that plea.

“In other words, no evidence appeared on the record from which it could be said  that the deceased had done any act to the appellant which would, and did, cause in him a sudden and  temporary loss of self-control, rendering him so subject to passion as to make him for the moment not master of his mind.”

Continuing with his summation, Justice Luckhoo said: “ In this case, the appellant had gone to his mother-in-law, Seupallie, for lunch, during which he had imbibed a certain quantity of drink.   The evidence reveals that three persons drank a quarter bottle of rum.  After having his lunch, he returned back to his home with his wife and children. Seupallie was on her verandah not far from the appellant’s home when she heard talking. Presumably, there was a quarrel.  She then saw her daughter go out on her own verandah, and the appellant followed her saying that he was going to kill her, whereupon she said to him, ‘Kill me nah!’  He then plunged a knife into her body, which Seupallie saw used more than once.  Soon after, the daughter fell to the floor and died.   Seupallie shouted for help, and one Paul Benjamin and another went to the scene.

“There was no evidence that the appellant’s wife had in any way provoked this grave attack on her.   Paul Benjamin admitted that he took a piece of wood and he struck the appellant on his head for the purpose of disarming him because at that point of time he had a cutlass in his hand.

“The appellant gave up the cutlass and the knife and told people about the place that he had killed his wife, and he wanted to be taken to the police station.  At the police station, he repeated that statement  — that he had killed his wife.   He made a written statement to the police in which he said, ‘Ah stab she wid the knife pun she left side because Paul Benjamin, she brother, lash me wid ah bellnah pan me head.’   Paul Benjamin, on the evidence at the preliminary inquiry, was not at the appellant’s home at the time when he stabbed  his wife.   He went there afterwards.

“In that setting, then, can this court say that the sentence of 10 years was excessive?  Or was it not an appropriate sentence?  Lord DENNING in his memorandum to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, used these words in relation to punishment.

“Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrongdoing; and in order to maintain respect for the law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted  for grave crimes should adequately reflect  the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them.”

Justice Luckhoo went on to say that on the facts as appear on the depositions, there was little, if anything, in mitigation of the crime committed.   “The appellant,” he said, “had had the benefit of his plea to manslaughter, and accepted which was an extraordinary advantage in the circumstances.   I will assume that there was genuine remorse.   Surely the trial judge must have had this in his mind when he said in his memorandum of sentence:

‘Having agreed to all the circumstances of this case, the character of the defendant, and with the hope of effecting a reformation on the defendant … I imposed a sentence of 10 years.’

“In any event in this case it is immaterial whether the appellant’s remorse did or did not enter into the judge’s consideration when imposing sentence, as the sentence on the facts was appropriate and a proper one.

“It is the judgment of this court then that the application for leave to appeal be refused.  The appeal is dismissed and the conviction and sentence affirmed.”