POWER-SHARING is attractive to the traditional and new opposition groups in Guyana, not as a means of conflict resolution and governance, but as a less competitive way of entering the corridors of power. And it, indeed, is a stunningly eye-catching phenomenon in this election season.
We can start in 1998 with the former UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Anan, who exhorted Africa’s leaders to abandon the ‘winner takes all’ political mentality; and then we have the U.S. which constantly pushes the notion of free and competitive elections.
Spears in the Third World Quarterly in 2000 noted that power-sharing deals are quite problematic to execute, and their survival rate is low; in 1986, there were six (6) cases of power-sharing, and in 1997, there were six (6) cases. Yet, as Spears’ paper talked about the attractiveness of power-sharing as a method of conflict resolution, this phenomenon continues to experience frequent failures.
When the Dergue in Ethiopia in 1991 lost power, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) invited the opposition into its fold; 31 parties and groups participated in the July conference; the EPRDF secured most of the seats, but the OLF and ethnic-based parties also received some seats to become part of the transitional council; in less than a year, it was all in shambles, as the OLF and its allies withdrew from the government.
Angola negotiated a peace agreement in Bicesse, Portugal in 1992; but both UNITA and MPLA decided to have ‘winner takes all’ elections; UNITA lost the election in 1992, and declared war, then endorsed a power-sharing agreement in Lusaka in 1994; agreement created conflictful situations, then war followed in 1998.
Even in South Africa with its effective power-sharing-style government, the National Party removed itself from the Mandela coalition government prior to the end of its term.
In Tajikistan, former President Rakhmon Nabiev established a Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) in order to ease political tensions. This power-sharing formula disintegrated quickly due to pressure from regional elites, internal conflicts, limited cooperation, and stubbornness of the majority group to sustain its old methods of governance.
In 2002 in Israel, former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres reached a deadlock on the appointment of an Ambassador to the U.S. These two senior politicians, under the Israeli power-sharing arrangement, had to consensually agree on major ambassadorship appointments. Peres accepted Sallai Meridor, a member of Sharon’s Likud Party, as a candidate, because Peres wanted a member of his Labour Party to control Jewish immigration to Israel.
Under the Israeli power-sharing arrangement, political gridlock is quite frequent on numerous other issues, and indeed, not excluding the Israeli/Palestinian ‘eternal’ peace process over the years.  This type of political bargaining is more a product of sectional interests than a product of meritocratic principles and national interests.

Quote: ‘Power-sharing is attractive to the traditional and new opposition groups in Guyana, not as a means of conflict resolution and governance, but as a less competitive way of entering the corridors of power’

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the difficulty of its power-sharing structures retarded progress in many sections of the Dayton Peace Accord. This difficulty reduced understanding of issues, and hindered participation in issue-based politics. In fact, the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) argued that the absence of issue-based politics encouraged ethnic politics. The ECMI reported, too, that parties, reluctant to compromise, delayed and obstructed decision making in the power-sharing institutions. Further, some parties instead of settling differences within the power-sharing structures, unilaterally withdrew, or threatened withdrawal from the power-sharing arrangement.
Suriname introduced consociationalism after World War II to transcend ethnic politics, according to Dew. The result of that experiment increased ethnic power-sharing in the military, and subsequently suffered an abrupt termination. Suriname currently has no grand coalition in the spirit of consociationalism, as the Venetiaan Government has a coalition of only four parties out of a total of 21 parties in the country.
All the coalition arrangements in Tajikstan, Israel, and Bosnia-Herzogovina produced unstable governments and political gridlock. These countries with high levels of polarization carry the ingredients for problematic coalition arrangements. And there is Altman’s finding that the greater the polarization, the less the chances for stable coalitions. This finding seems consistent with the political scenarios in Tajikstan, Israel, and Bosnia-Herzogovina.
Suriname prides itself in the view that it has a stable coalition, and not carrying the perceived burden of ethnic schism as its neighbour, Guyana, and therefore appears to have little or no polarization. Again, in referencing Altman’s finding, Suriname, with minimum or no polarization and having a party system with similar-type ideology, stands a good chance of sustaining stable coalitions.
Altman’s finding reinforces Sisk’s position on power-sharing arrangements. Sisk argues that power-sharing arrangements would need moderates for sustainability purposes. If moderates do not participate, then extremists would take over, as was the case with the Arusha Agreement in 1993 in Rwanda.
Power-sharing, with its limited success through numerous discontinuities and interruptions since the 1950s, can hardly enable us to speak of its reliability. But this is the election season.