Quote: ‘Power-sharing crusaders believe that power-sharing will produce national unity and eliminate ethnic mistrust and ethnic insecurity. Let’s not delude ourselves as to its capacity for conflict resolution’

Quote: ‘The basis for a change in any political system has to do with eliminating mechanisms, negatively impacting the betterment of people’s lives. Some mechanisms could be lack of political inclusiveness, ethnic marginalization, and racial discrimination, among others’

THE ELECTION season is upon us again, perhaps, this time we may be fortunate to have a double whammy with the happening of both local government and national elections. For this reason, it is predictable to see the usual ‘power-sharing’ theme now emerging from hibernation after a protracted absence; or is it illness? Never mind this stretched absence from the political theatre, the Guyanese people will now have something to munch on.
We sometimes see power-sharing as political risk-sharing. At other times, power-sharing addresses conflict management, if it is functional at all, but not conflict resolution. Perhaps, it would now be more feasible to talk about structures of inclusiveness rather than power-sharing!!
According to Sisk, power-sharing refers to practices and institutions that produce broad-based governing coalitions inclusive of all major ethnic groups. Even so, in a power-sharing arrangement, we need to ask these questions:
–    Would the PPP/C, the PNC/R, and the rest of the opposition share authority in the same ministry?
–    Would the PPP/C control some authority in the ministry, and the opposition control some?
–    What would be the role of the president and the leader of the opposition in this new dispensation?
–    Would Guyana have two presidents with two offices of the president?
–    Who would chair Cabinet meetings?
–    To whom will ministers and statutory boards be accountable?
–    Whose campaign promises would require fulfillment?
–    Will there be two sets of Cabinet?
–    How would we address political loyalty?
–    How would we address gridlock?
–    Which Party’s manifesto will carry the day?
And there are other questions. The answers to these questions create more difficulties than exist at present.
The two theories of power-sharing are the consociational theory and the integrative theory.
Arend Lijphart’s consociational theory (cross-ethnic power-sharing) “…means government by elite cartel to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.” The consociational theory indicates that elite cooperation will be able to accommodate political conflicts through compromise.  Lijphart presented four elements of consociational democracy: Grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto.  Later, he introduced consensus democracy as a softer option, but which eventually lost ground to consociationalism.
Lijphart’s consociational theory had its genesis in the Dutch society, where he overstated the level of that society’s fragmentation. In Dutch society, social class was not a prominent variable. A comprehensive study of Dutch society characterised as a plural society showed that religious and class divisions intersected each other, producing little political instability.
Barry argued that Switzerland was never a divided society, and that its Federal Council is not a Grand Coalition, to which Lipjhart alluded; it is not a Grand Coalition because its members do not primarily represent any subcultures, and decisions emanate through a referendum. The theory focuses on elite behavior and elite cooperation as necessary and sufficient to produce political stability, thereby excluding the role of the masses or working classes in decision making.  In this way, consociational theory excludes participation of the lower levels of civil society.
And Rupert Taylor’s book, ‘Consociational Theory: McGarry & O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict’ (2009) talked about the decline of consociationalism between 1980 and the mid-1990s. The highpoint for consociationalism was in the 1950s when there were 11 cases; in 1986, six (6) cases, prompting Sue Halpern to say that “the model of consociational democracy has not been deployed with much success.” In 1997, there were six (6) cases; Ian Lustick then noted in World Politics that consociationalism lost its centre and became a degenerative research agenda item. There now may be a regeneration of consociationalism, but with its numerous discontinuities and interruptions since the 1950s, we can hardly speak of its reliability, never mind its success.
The power-sharing models arose during the Cold War period when the United Sates imposed its will on many developing countries. The U.S. imposition happened because of the dependent nature of these States. Where developing countries were dependent, the U.S. wielded greater control. Power-sharing arrangements did not achieve the level of political stability necessary for human development, but, indeed, created a sustained form of dependence to the U.S. and to other superpowers at different points in history. Israel, with some power-sharing arrangement, receives considerable foreign aid from the U.S., which, in turn, inputs the Israeli political process as and when needed. This is happening right now with Vice-President Joe Biden’s comments on the Jewish settlement, and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton acting as Biden’s enforcer.
And advocates for power-sharing constantly emerge with scathing attacks on the Westminster model as a political system. But we must be careful that we do not throw out the baby with the bath water.  Former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams felt that the Westminster model helped his country “to avoid producing our own barbarities and monsters…The prime requirement of the new developing states is not for more freedoms but for discipline. In any country with tribal, racial, or religious hostilities, the essential need is strong and unified management.”
Williams did not support coalition politics. Nonetheless, the power-sharing concept now is taking centre-stage in Guyana, where its advocates see it as halting ethnic excesses. Power-sharing crusaders believe that power-sharing will produce national unity and eliminate ethnic mistrust and ethnic insecurity. Let’s not delude ourselves as to its capacity for conflict resolution. And do we really have the Westminster model in Guyana? And what about bringing on greater structures of inclusiveness?
The basis for a change in any political system has to do with eliminating mechanisms, negatively impacting the betterment of people’s lives. Some mechanisms could be lack of political inclusiveness, ethnic marginalization, and racial discrimination, among others.
Nevertheless, we already may have a situation where both African and Indian Guyanese share comparable Socioeconomic Status (SES) at each class level, considering their population proportions. This comparability in SES could induce us to rethink our position on marginalization and discrimination. But we need more research.
And what about our existing structures of political inclusiveness; any discussion of power-sharing must acknowledge the ‘what is?’ And the ‘what is’ is in abundance for starters. For this reason, let us not pretend that there is no existing structure of inclusiveness.
Plus, do politicians ever ask their supporters what they want? Some self-interested politicians’ voices incessantly tell us what they want. Let the people decide whether or not they want power-sharing! Or perhaps, this ‘shared governance’ thing.