IN 1999, Senior Counsel Dereck Jagan had claimed from Karran Ganpat, et all, $24. 5 million for legal services rendered, but this was refused him by a High Court Judge and the Guyana Court of Appeal.The respondents denied that there was an agreement to pay $25 million but submitted that the agreement was for them to pay $50, 000 for each letter written on their behalf, which was done.
The trial judge rejected the appellant’s evidence and accepted that of the respondents. The appellant claimed that the trial judge misdirected himself on the evidence.
The Guyana Court of Appeal held that the case was purely dependent on the facts and there was no reason to say that the trial judge erred in not believing the appellant.
It also held that the Appellant’s evidence that the first respondent had agreed to pay him $25 million as fees even if the claim was unsuccessful was so improbably that it would tax the credibility of even the most trusting mind.
Rex McKay, S.C. and Edward Luckhoo, S.C., appeared for the appellant while Khemraj Ramjattan appeared for the respondents.
The Court of Appeal was constituted by Cecil Kennard, Chancellorm and Justices of Appeal Maurice Churaman and Lennox Perry.
Delivering the judgment Chancellor Kennard noted that the appellant had instituted proceedings by way of a specially endorsed writ in the High Court claiming from the respondents the sum of $24.5 million, being the balance of the sum of $25, 000 which the respondents through the first-named respondent had agreed to pay for legal services rendered by the appellant for pursuing certain claims against two insurance companies, namely Caribbean Home Insurance Company , whose agents in Guyana are John Fernandes Insurance Limited and the Hand in Hand Mutual Fire Insurance Company Limited.
The respondents’ business premises, with its stocks, situated at Vreed-en-Hoop, West Bank, Demerara, which were destroyed by fire, were insured by the respondents with the above mentioned two companies against loss by fire.
It was the appellant’s case at the High Court trial, as revealed in his statement of claim, and support by his evidence at the trial ,that in the month of August, 1995 the 1st named respondent had consulted him with a view of commencing negotiations with two insurance companies with a view of having their claims satisfied by the said two companies.
The appellant alleged that there was an agreement between himself and 1st named respondent who is the alter ego for the 2nd named respondent, for him to be paid a fee of $20 million in respect of the claims against Caribbean Home Insurance Company and a further fee of $5 million in respect of the claim against the Hand in Hand Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Limited.
It was the further contention of the Appellant that the agreement between himself and the 1st named respondent was that the fee of $25 million was payable whether or not the said claims were settled out of court or whether or not it became necessary to prosecute the respondents claims in the High Court for the recovery of the amounts claimed by the respondents against the two insurance companies.
After negotiations with the two companies ,so the appellant contended, they agreed to pay the respondents a total sum of $155.6 million. Of this amount, $130 million was paid by Caribbean Home Insurance Company and the balance of $25.6 million was paid by Hand –in-Hand.
The appellant claimed that he was paid a total sum of $430, 000 as his fees made as follows:
$100, 000 by cheque on 18-12-95
$50,000 by cheque on 24-09-96
US$2000 by cheque on 6-11-96

The equivalent Guyana dollars for this latter amount at the rate of $140(G) to $1(US) being $280, leaving a balance of $24.5 million, which he had claimed in the High Court and which had been dismissed by the trial judge.
In defence, the respondents had disputed that there was any such arrangement, as was contended for by the Appellant but the 1st named respondent had testified at the trial that the arrangement was for him to pay the appellant the sum of $50, 000 for each letter written on their behalf to the two Insurance Companies.
The respective cases of the parties were summarised by the trial judge, who had dismissed the Appellant’s claim for the balance of $24, 570 in the High Court in the following terms:
“The Plaintiff contended that there was an agreed fee of $20 (M) payable by the defendant on the conclusion of the claim against Caribbean Home Insurance Company and a further fee at the conclusion of the claim against Hand –in-Hand .
“On the other hand, the Defendant claimed the agreement between himself and the plaintiff was that he had retained the latter to speed up the process in relation to his claims and that the Plaintiff had charged him a fee of $50, 000 for each letter that he sent and this he had agreed to pay.”
At the High Court trial, only two persons had testified, namely, the Appellant and the 1st named respondent. After listening to the evidence of the parties and the submission of Counsel on both sides, who are the same here, the trial judge dismissed the Appellant’s case and in his written judgment he had stated inter alia:
“The Defendant stated that the arrangement with the plaintiff was that he was to pay him $50, 000 for each such letter that was sent by the plaintiff on his behalf. This version of the arrangement I accepted as being true after seeing the parties in the witness box and hearing their evidence.
“Apart from seeing the parties and hearing their evidence on an examination of the exhibits, I am fortified in view that the defendant was speaking the truth.
“In the circumstances, taking the evidence of both the plaintiff and the Defendant as a whole , I accepted the Defendant’s evidence as being truthful and rejected the Plaintiff’s evidence whenever it conflicted with that of the Defendant and as such I hold that the arrangement was that the Plaintiff was to be paid $50, 000 per letter which was done.”
The Chancellor added: “Bearing in mind that the greatest weight has to be attached to the findings of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses (per Viscount Dilhome in Onasis v. Vergothis (supra) at p. 416 ) I must dismiss the appeal and affirm the order of the trial judge as I do not consider that there sufficient reasons for displacing the decision of the trial judge.”
Justice of Appeal Lennox Perry, who concurred, added: “I have had the pleasure of reading the judgment of the Learned Chancellor in this matter and I entirely agree with his findings on the facts and the law as set out by him.
“The facts have been so clearly defined and set out that I do not intend to repeat the.
“The issue in this matter is clearly one of fact and the clear indication is that the learned trial judge did not believe or accept the evidence of the Appellant Dereck Jagan.
“The learned trial judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing both the Appellant and the Respondent and made up his mind as to who he believed.
“Had I been sitting as a Judge of the High Court in this matter I could hardly have come to any conclusion different from the one to which the learned trial judge came.”