I PROPOSE in this article to show that the formation of the PNC-UF coalition Government was to a large extent externally driven and fit into a larger geopolitical and strategic framework.

This explained in part why two political parties with contrasting ideological dispositions came together to form a post-election coalition Government even though ideologically the PNC was much closer to the PPP than towards the right wing business-oriented United Force.

The formation of the coalition Government in 1964 could be seen as a marriage of convenience between two ideologically divergent political parties who are united in a common objective, namely to remove the PPP from political office.

Out of desperation Dr. Jagan finally agreed to allow the British Government to arbitrate. As expected, the British Government refused to fix a date for independence, imposed the Israeli model of PR and proposed new elections in 1964, one year earlier than due.

It was done more out of political expediency rather than a real desire to work together in furtherance of the working and living conditions of the working people.

To create the conditions for the removal of the PPP, the Governments of both the United States and Britain were deeply involved in the domestic politics of the colony and actually engineered the disturbances of the 1962 and 1963 period.

The disturbances failed to bring the PPP Government but it suceeded in posting a constitution conference which was due in May 1962 to October 13, 1962. Interestingly, the two major Opposition parties opposed independence. They found common grounds and introduced demands for new elections under the system of proportional representation. The pre-conference PNC slogan was ‘No PR, No independence’.

The PPP’s position at the time was that the issue of electoral system had already been settled in 1960. The Opposition however, based its case on the point that the PPP had not been elected by a majority of the electorate.

The PPP rejected that position on the ground that it was immaterial whether it had 50% of the votes or not, like the UK and other commonwealth countries. Besides, the PPP had concentrated on winning a majority of the seats and not a majority of the votes. Indeed, that was why it only contested 29 of the thirty-five seats.

The whole aim of insisting on PR was to remove the PPP from office. The PPP rejected PR out of an awareness that in several other countries where PR was instituted the result was a multiplicity of parties and weak Government based on coalition, sometimes with small groups wielding influence out of proportion to its support by holding a balance between two of the larger parties as in fact happened after the 1964 elections.

The PPP objected to the demand for new elections on the ground that the Opposition had made clear and categorical statements that independence would follow “within a matter of months” and that whichever party won the 1961 election would lead the country into independence.

It was clear that the conference was heading for a breakdown since none of the sides were prepared to budge on their original positions. The PPP, in a last minute effort to save the talks from collapse, agreed, even though reluctantly, to have new elections provided it was done under the traditional first past the post but this was rejected by the Opposition.
After several rounds of proposals and counterproposals, the talks finally broke down due primarily to a convergence of interests between the British Government and the Opposition not to grant political independence to the country under a PPP Government mainly out of geo-political and ideological considerations.
Further efforts initiated by the Governor to get the two sides to agree on a way forward failed to yield fruit. A proposal for mediation by a Commonwealth team was rejected by the British Government on the ground that it will not bring about a satisfactory resolution and only prolong the stalemate.
Several proposals advanced by the PPP to arrive at a compromise did not find favour with the Opposition including the adoption of a mixed first past the post and constituency model as in the case of Suriname, which incidentally the PNC once lauded. Instead, both the PNC and the UF insisted on the Israeli model of PR alone.

Out of desperation Dr. Jagan finally agreed to allow the British Government to arbitrate. As expected, the British Government refused to fix a date for independence, imposed the Israeli model of PR and proposed new elections in 1964, one year earlier than due.

There are some who felt that Dr. Jagan made a tactical error in allowing the British to arbitrate knowing fully well that, the dice was not loaded against him. To those who genuinely felt that way, this was how Dr. Jagan explained his decision:
“Our position in Government had become untenable and humiliating. In actual fact, although we were in office we were without any of the real power which a Government ordinarily has, as has been shown, especially during the 1963 disturbances when our Government was under seige. What is more, the Colonial Office, in reply to our request for financial assistance to meet a possible shortage of money for the payment of salaries to civil servants, had insisted on a financial inspection by its appointee, K. C. Jacobs, and had later stated that direct assistance from the British Treasury to meet the anticipated budgetary deficit of about 5 million in 1964 would have to mean Treasury control.
This would have meant going backward, not forward, and an indefinite delay of independence. It was to me the last straw; life was already unbearable and difficult under existing conditions. In this situation, my attitude was, “Do your damnedest: we cannot carry on under existing conditions plus United Kingdom Treasury Control.”
In addition to the above, it was Dr. Jagan’s firm belief that had he returned home without a decision on independence, the Opposition would have found some new pretext to create trouble as it did in 1962 with the budget.
In any case, according to Dr. Jagan, the British Government would have imposed its will in any event in keeping with the wishes of the U.S. Government, which was to unseat the PPP and install an Opposition in power either by suspending the constitution as it did in 1953 or by calling for a referendum on proportional representation.

(By Hydar Ally)