Judge’s misdirection causes confusion in jury’s mind

-murder accused to go free, pending new trial
IN 1960, the Federal Supreme Court in its Criminal Appellate jurisdiction allowed the appeal of murder accused, Baldeo  Dihal  on the grounds that the trial judge’s misdirection on the law as it related to the facts was likely to cause confusion in the jury’s mind.
The accused, who was found guilty by the jury, was sentenced to death.  He appealed.
The Federal Appellate Court, constituted by Justices Rennie, Archer and Wylie, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and death sentence, but ordered a new trial in the interest of justice.
The appellate court held that on the trial of a person charged with murder, the judge should relate the law to the facts in the case.
It was pointed out that when dealing with the question of provocation, mention should not be made of cooling time, if the evidence clearly shows that no time elapsed between the provocation and the retaliation,  and more so, where any such mention of cooling time may cause confusion in the mind of the jury.
The appellate court ruled, as it allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, that it is the duty of the judge, in his summing up, to deal adequately with the evidence relating to self-defence.
Attorney-at-law, Mr. Stanley Hardyal appeared for the appellant, while Mr. W Persaud represented the Crown.
Delivering the judgment of the court, Justice Rennie declared that at the close of the argument, they allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and set aside the sentence.
According to him: “The grounds of appeal are numerous and somewhat wide in scope, but, with the exception of the ground of misdirection, we saw no merit in any of them, and for that reason, refrain from making  reference to any ground other than misdirection.”
He said “exception was taken to the form of the directions when dealing with the questions of self-defence and provocation,” and that it was submitted “that the law was laid down in one compartment, so to speak, and the facts were referred to in another.” No attempt was ever made to relate the one to the other, Justice Rennie said, adding: “The directions do seem to deserve this criticism.  The law of self-defence was meticulously explained as a lecturer might well explain it to a class of students.”
He, however, stressed that nowhere in the directions is the jury told what facts they should take into account when considering this aspect of the case, and that the nearest they ever came to  having the facts related  to self-defence is the statement  that when considering  self-defence, it would be relevant for them to compare the wounds on the body of the deceased  with the injuries on the appellant.  The statement at reference, however, deals with only one factor of self-defence, and that is whether there was the necessity to use such force.
On the issue of self-defence and the direction concerning it, Justice Rennie said: “We shall have more to say at a later stage of these reasons, but now return to the matter under consideration.”
According to Justice Rennie, the jury was told:
“If in all the circumstances as a reasonable man, he feels that he is in danger — serious danger — he is entitled to take steps to defend himself, if necessary to the extent of killing, but though he can do that, it is his duty to retreat if he can reasonably do so in all the circumstances.
“You may think that it is not a very manly thing to do to run away if a person is attacking you or threatening to attack you.  But it is the law.”
Noting that nowhere in the directions were they told what facts they should take into account in determining whether or not to retreat was reasonable, Justice Rennie said: “The evidence I accepted would seem to suggest that retreat was not possible, and it must be confusing to a jury in such circumstances to be told that although it may be considered not manly to retreat, the law nonetheless  requires it if  the person attacked can reasonably do so.
“As in the case of self-defence,” he said, “so in the case of provocation; no assistance was given to the jury by relating the evidence to the law.   We can see a possibility of some confusion being caused in the minds of the jury by this failure to relate the one to the other.  Such a confusion could have been caused by reason of their being told:
“If there was time for cooling between the time that the provocation was given and the time that the killing was done, then, of course, you cannot get the benefit of provocation to reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter.”
These directions, Justice Rennie said, were given in spite of the fact  that the evidence, if believed, showed  that no time had elapsed between the provocation and the retaliation.  “In another case,” he said, “such an excess of direction in law  might not have confused the jury, but in the present case, where evidence was given of the relationship that existed between the deceased and the appellant’s mother as a motive for the alleged offence, the jury might very well have found themselves in the position where they would ask themselves the question: ‘What did the judge mean when he referred to cooling time?   Had he in mind the relationship between the deceased and the appellant’s mother?’   There was nothing else in the case,  apart from the encounter, that might have affected the appellant’s mind, and if there could have been no question  of cooling time with regard to the encounter, the jury must necessarily  have wondered why they were told about cooling time and, more-so, when they remembered that they were told that it is important, and still more-so, having regard to the fact that the directions on provocation ruled out the relationship between the deceased and the applicant’s mother.”
In noting that apart from the criticisms at reference of the directions that there is also a serious misdirection on the question of self-defence, this being the evidence of the attack which the appellant said he repelled, Justice Rennie said: “That evidence, shortly put, is to the effect that the appellant was held by the neck, choked, and when he fell in the swamp, was being stifled.”
Justice Rennie noted that the choking and stifling seemed to the court to be of far greater consequence and amounted to a serious misdirection.
The appeal was allowed, conviction and death sentence set aside, and a new trial ordered.

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