A dispute between the Plaintiffs (Respondents) and Defendants (Appellants) regarding hours of work, premium time and overtime pay was referred to arbitration.

The arbitrators stated that should there be an argument that is reached that is more favourable to the employees than the arbitral award; the former is to be binding.
The Plaintiffs argued, at trial, that the arbitral award entitled them to receive one day’s pay for every week of the period of the award, as well as one additional time for work done on one of the six days they were scheduled to work, and two additional day’s pay for work done on one of the six days they were not scheduled to work in the week.
The Plaintiffs requested that the Court confirm their interpretation of the award. The trial judge found in favour of the Plaintiffs.
The Guyana Court of Appeal, constituted by Chancellor Victor Crane and Justices of Appeal Luckhoo and Vieira held that the trial judge lost sight of the distinction between premium times and overtime pay. Premium time was defined as applicable to extra payment for doing special work.
Overtime pay, on the other hand, can be granted to employees for any normal work outside the eight-hour work day. Since these two forms of compensation are different in nature, it is not possible to say that one is more advantageous to the worker than the other, and so it is impossible to interpret the arbitral award as suggested by the Plaintiffs/Respondents.
Appeal allowed. Costs awarded to the Appellants.
Mr. J. A. King, SC, with T. Rodney appeared for the Appellants and Mr. A. Chase with D. Dial and C. Hamilton appeared for the Respondents.
Chancellor Crane who delivered the judgment said: “The first and second-named Plaintiffs are dispensers and were at all material times employed by Messrs Bookers Sugar Estates, Limited , the first named Defendant, registered as a body corporate under the Companies Act and engaged in the manufacture of sugar for gain.
The third-named Plaintiff is also a dispenser and employed by the Demerara Company Limited, another sugar factory engaged in the manufacture of sugar.
In the High Court, all three Plaintiffs sued both in their individual capacities and as representing thirty-five medical of the first-named Defendant , employees of the first-named defendant as aforesaid.
The fourth-named Plaintiff is a registered trade union, No. 40, under the Trade Unions Act and was joined in these proceedings as an interested party in arbitration proceedings, conducted by Mr. J. O.F. Haynes, S.C. in March, 1974. The third-named Defendant is also a body corporate , registered and incorporated under the Companies Act Cap. 89:01 , and is an interested party in the relief claimed against the first and second-named Defendant.
In March, 1974, the National Association of Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Employees and the Guyana Sugar Producers Association Limited agreed to refer to arbitration by Mr. J. O. F. Haynes ,S. C., a dispute touching , inter alia , the hours of work and overtime of dispensers employed by the first and second named Defendants ,and for all parties to be bound by the arbitral award.
Mr. Haynes made his award on 27th November , 1974 and gave clarification of it in documents dated December 9th and December 20th , 1974.
Continuing delivering his judgment , Chancellor Crane declared : “In the light of the above, overtime at 1 ½ types in the award may well turn out to be more profitable to the employee than premium time payment in the memorandum since it is quite possible for a worker to earn overtime on every day he performs ordinary work in excess of his normal eight hours per day .
“Premium time may be earned only in respect of one day in the week. Overtime and Premium time are conceptually different payments in the sugar industry , and may not readily be compared the one with the other as being more advantageous to a dispenser .
“Where it is said in Memo ‘E’ that ‘it will be seen that this will be a substantial improvement in the existing situation.
“What it is meant to emphasise is a comparison between the existing situation where there was equivalent time off (i.e., no monetary payment for either premium or overtime) and the system of monetary remuneration now being ushered in under Memo ‘E’.
“For the above reasons, we are unable to say like the trial judge that the conditions “laid down (in the Memorandum) are certainly more advantageous to the worker.
“It must follow that it is impossible for us to interpret the meaning and effect of the Arbitrator’s award as suggested by learned counsel for the fourth-named Plaintiff as approved by the judge .
“We find on the true construction of p 8 of Memo ‘E’, it does not mean that seven days’ pay should be given for a sixth-day work-week and for that reason we are unable to say there was justification for making any of the declarations or orders sought in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents.
“The appeal is therefore allowed with costs here and below’.