Voice identification became ‘features’ identification

A WOMAN who was raped and robbed by three (3) men in 1965 told investigators that she had identified the appellant by the side of his face and his voice.

At the jury trial, she added, “I recognised the appellant Wilkie by his voice, his rising cheekbone, straight nose, large ears and a cut on the nose bridge between eyes”.
However, under cross-examination she admitted, “ I did not give such a detailed description either to the police or to the magistrate at the Preliminary Inquiry.”

As a consequence, on appeal, the Guyana Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction and sentence. Wilkie was freed.

The facts of the case disclosed that the woman was sleeping in a room with her four children whilst her husband was out at work. About 5 a.m., three masked men entered the home, covered her face and proceeded to rob and rape her.

The next day, whilst the victim was sitting on her neighbour’s step, she saw a man who came up close to her and asked her to allow him to pass. She said she recognised his voice and she went to the gate, looked at him and recognised him by his high cheekbone.
Later, as a result of a report, the appellant was arrested and taken to the station where the victim subsequently confirmed that he was one of her assailants.

At the trial in the High Court she said that she recognised the appellant by his rising cheekbones, straight nose, large ears and a cut on his nose-bridge between his eyes, but she admitted in cross-examination that she had not given such a detailed description either to the Magistrate or to the police, but had told the Magistrate that she had only seen the side of his face.

The Guyana Court of Appeal constituted by Chancellor Kenneth Stoby, Justices Luckhoo and Cummings at a trial in May, 1967, held that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable because (i) it was clear that identification of the appellant was really by voice since she did not see his face as it was covered and she only saw the side of the face when the men were leaving ; (ii) although there may be circumstances in which it may be proper to convict by the mere identification of a voice, this was not such a case, and (iii) it was the duty of the trial Judge to have stressed to the jury (which he had not done) that what was originally a “voice” identification became, at the trial, a “features” identification .
The Appeal was allowed.

Mr. C. A. Massiah represented the appellant, while Mr. C.A. G. Pompey, then
Senior Crown Counsel appeared for the respondent.

Delivering the judgment, Chancellor Stoby disclosed that on the 14th September 1965, a woman was asleep in her room with her four children; her husband was at work. About 5 o’ clock in the morning three men entered her room and committed the heinous crime: they robbed her and raped her. The appellant was convicted as being one of the three men concerned. He appealed.

At his trial the main issue was identification. There was no doubt of the house being broken and entered, of the robbery and of the rape. The appellant was identified in this way: The day after the robbery the victim was sitting on the steps of the next door house. A man came close to her and asked to be permitted to pass. She said she recognised his voice, went to the gate, had a look at him, and recognised him by the high cheekbone. A report was made to the police, the appellant was arrested, locked up, and the woman was sent to give a statement. On arrival at the station, she confirmed he was one of the men.
The judge told the jury that the question of identification was most important. The jury, as I have said, convicted.

Continuing, Chancellor Stoby noted that several grounds of appeal have been argued, but in view of the decision to which the court has come it is only necessary to deal with the main ground, and that is, that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable.
The principle on which the court proceeds in a matter of this kind where a ground of appeal is that the verdict is unreasonable is well-known and has been set out in a number of cases.

After analysing a number of cases Chancellor Stoby added, if one analyses very briefly the evidence of identification, in this case, this is what took place; The man who entered the victim’s house had his face covered; the woman’s face was covered after the three men entered.

In the Magistrate’s Court, she told the magistrate that she only saw the side of the face of the man who she alleged was the appellant.

In the High Court when giving evidence she said that she recognised the appellant because of his rising cheekbones a, straight nose, large ears, and a cut on his nose bridge between the eyes.

In cross-examination when it was pointed out to her that she had not said that in the Magistrate’s Court, and indeed had not given that description to the police, she repeated that she recognised him because of his high cheekbones, the cut on his face, his large ears, and so on. She admitted that she did not give that description to the police and she admitted that she did not give those details in the Magistrate’s Court.

Accordingly to the Chancellor, obviously then, there are certain disturbing circumstances about the identification. It is quite evident that the identification was really by voice; that she came to the conclusion that the appellant was one of the three men who had raped her because of his voice.

Since she did not see his face, since her face was covered and since the only time she had an opportunity of seeing the side of his face was when the men were leaving, it is quite clear to us that what aroused her suspicion was the tone of his voice, Chancellor Stoby declared, as he allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence.
Justices Luckhoo and Cummings concurred.