Dear Editor,
PERMIT me, please, Sir, if you may, to offer a few comments on the recently published decisions of the Honourable Chief Justice, on the no-confidence vote issues.
I will skip the preliminaries and venture directly unto the reported decisions:
(i) (a) It was reported that the Chief Justice ruled that 33 will always be the majority of the number 65.
33 is, perhaps, always the majority in ‘a SIMPLE MAJORITY of 65’ situation, where the scenario is ‘all those present and voting’. However, if one were, as in the extant case, examining the majority of ‘all the elected members’, where every member is required to be present [either by proxy or in person], that circumstance renders the judgement on the resultant vote to be decided using the ABSOLUTE MAJORITY rule. An ABSOLUTE MAJORITY calculation has to be one [1} more than half [1/2] of all the elected members, NOT ON ‘all the members present and voting’.

(b) Therefore, in the circumstance under consideration, the ‘one more than half’ rule [ ABSOLUTE MAJORITY], applied, means that one [1] more than half [ 32 ½ ] ought to be the judgement. That would be, in this case, one [1] more than 32 ½, which produces 33 ½.

(c) Since my Arithmetic days in Standard One – the ‘good ole’ days of Grammar and Arithmetic’, the principle has been drummed into our mathematics psyche that, whenever there is a resultant fraction lower than half [½ ] or [.5], the answer is recorded to the lower whole number. Coterminously, the next higher whole number is recorded when the fraction is half [½ or .5] or higher. That is the applicable mathematical principle.

(d) Logic and Rationality cannot linger even a minuscule moment, but, perforce, must rush, post haste, to enforce mathematics’ rigour, to prevent its slicing arm from fractionising a human being. 32 ½ persons of the 65, must be 33, it decrees; and 33 ½ persons have to be 34.

(e) 33 is the Absolute Majority of 64, ladies and gentlemen, not of 65. Indeed, one cannot apply a SIMPLE MAJORITY principle to the purport of Article 106(6), which does not say ‘of those present and voting’. It speaks to all the elected members of the National Assembly’. That is in accordance with all known Parliamentary procedures to which we have been subscribing from time immemorial. How the Honourable Chief Justice segued into the declaration that if 65 members were present, the majority of all elected members of the National Assembly would still be 33, boggles the mind. That is a SIMPLE MAJORITY, as contemplated in Article 168(i) [“ Save as otherwise provided by the Constitution, all questions proposed for decision’ shall be determined by a majority of the members present and voting”, not an ABSOLUTE MAJORITY, which the import of Article 106(6) contemplates, as I observed above.
(ii) It has been reported that the Honourable Chief Justice declared that if Mr. Persaud
had voted against the No-Confidence Motion, the government would have accepted that
the vote count of 33 was the majority. If, indeed, she had so declared, that declaration
would be a surprising, presumptive assumation, a level and state to which no judicial
officer ought normally and knowingly to descend. Surely, a moment’s or a few minutes’
reflection could refresh, reorder and reshape the thoughts of the most obdurate, much
more so, the mind of the Speaker; the possibility of which, I have no doubt at all, the
Honourable Chief Justice must surely be most keenly aware. How, then, and why she segued, askance,
and so cynically, into that statement she is reported to have made, is quite perplexing,
indeed!
More specifically, though, I make the following observations:
(a) Mr. Persaud’s vote could only be valid if he were acting in good faith, to honour the Laws, Rules, Regulations and Procedures expected of all Members of Parliament, as expected of all bona fides Members, under oath. That good faith expectation required of him the submission of a written declaration by him to the Speaker or the Representative of his Party’s List, that he intended to cast his vote for another party, in which case, he could not, in all good conscience and good faith, continue to sit in the Assembly as a member of his party, not for even a moment. That is what the Constitution demands. Otherwise, those provisions in Article 156 (3) (a) and (b), and even (c) are rendered utterly useless and meaningless, a condition to which no good judgement should/would give rise. Most assuredly, therefore, the failure of Member Persaud to act as he should, as Article 156 contemplates, breaching the clear, direct Constitutional requirement and to vote against his own party, notwithstanding the plain, unvarnished rule requiring such action, is, undoubtedly, a breach which no Court or Judicial Authority or the Speaker, ought to condone. The intention and purpose of that provision is clear; to allow, no doubt, the requirement of faithfulness to, and efficacy and strict operationalisation of, the Party List– as against the Constituency – principle. Were that not the case, the fundamental rationale undergirding the principles of governance of the e+
(b)
(c) .lection to, and endurance in, the National Assembly, under the current Constitution, becomes moribund, inoperable and useless.

(d) Mr. Persaud flouted, breached, disregarded, transgressed and negated, not an ordinary law, but the law which stands at the door of Parliament to permit him entry as a Member; the very law which gives authority for anyone, with such an intent, to be thus honoured, to remain an authentic, bona fides Member of the Assembly. (3) (a) and (b) of Article 156 are not optional or conditional, they are compulsory, obligatory and mandatory, and are prevenient to and supervisory over all the Articles bearing upon how the Assembly ought to proceed with its business. Notwithstanding, one may argue that the issue did not come before the Honourable Chief Justice for consideration. That is beside the point. Even if it did not, it is an issue so crucial to the governance mechanism of the Assembly; it is the fulcrum upon which the Party system of the Assembly’s modus vivendi and modus operandi twist and turn, that it could not be ignored. It is the whole raison d’etre of the Party system, it MUST be considered. Article 165 (2) does not nullify, nor gives nihility to, Article 156. In fact, 165 speaks of ‘any person not entitled….’. It does not speak of ‘any Member’. There is no place in the Constitution where any Member is referred to as ‘any person’. Indeed, there can be no occasion when/where a bona fide Member of the Assembly would be referred to as a person, or would have no right or reason to be in the Chamber. For example, a suspended member is not a Member in good standing, and his/her presence in the Assembly is considered as that of a non-member, a mere person, with no standing, as if he/she were a member of the public or any such persona. That is what Mr. Persaud became the moment he voiced a ‘YES’, instead of a ‘NO’. [Forgive the lengthy paragraph, please. It was just serving one expansive idea]

(e) Accordingly, the very moment the Member voted ‘YES’ to the motion, he ceased to be a Member of the National Assembly, because he became a person with no locus standi in the Assembly. Applying Article 165(2), therefore, in this context, was misconceived. Indeed, the presence of Member of Parliament Persaud, up to and including his vote, did not invalidate the proceedings of the Assembly. His vote was what was invalidated, the moment it was offered. At precisely that moment, he, ipso facto and by operation of the Law, ceased to be a Member, being in contravention of Article 156 (2) [having failed to notify the Speaker, in writing, of his inability to continue to support his Party as a Parliamentarian], but the proceedings of the Assembly continued, as it is required so to have, under Article 165(2), despite the presence of person [not Member] Persaud.

(f) That was so because Article 156 is meant, and was intended, to be pre-eminent to, and ought to take precedence over, any proceedings in the Assembly. In fact, it dictates and predetermines how a Member representing a given Party in Parliament ought to vote. There is absolutely no provision in the Constitution for ‘conscience’ voting. That is why Article 156 was conceived, embedded and entrenched [See Article 164 (2) (b)]. It is not to be taken lightly at all. Member Persaud was legally [Constitutionally] prohibited from voting for the other party’s interests. The Speaker’s acquiescence cannot nullify the Law [Constitution].

In other words, Member Persaud was not permitted by Law to so vote. The intent and purport of Article 156(3) are clearly indicative of the impermissibility of cross voting and voting against one’s Party. Article 160 (1) (a) and 160 (2) (a) further corroborate that prohibition.

(g) The Speaker’s ruling, in the circumstances, could not and does not validate Mr. Persaud’s non – vote. He had no written indication in his possession from Mr. Persaud. If he had, the Honourable Member Persaud would instantly have re-become [my word] Mr. Persaud, and would, in fact, not have been there, much less so, proffering a vote. The Speaker, obviously, did not refresh his mind with all the ramifications pertinent to the 156 provisions. Were he thus refreshed, he would most definitely have stopped Mr. Persaud in his tracks, long before he [ person Persaud ]was able to triple-firm [my word again, for affirming three times; some of us have earned the authority to make words, when the occasion dictates no existing word could adequately express a novel or unprecedented phenomenon].
His vote was, therefore, invalid, ab initio, and was, therefore, a non-vote. Accepting his vote as valid was to impute that he could validly abandon his party, on the National Assembly floor, or otherwise, and vote against it in support of the opposition party, on the Assembly’s floor. His purported voting in favour of the Opposition was, in effect, just that; a purporting to vote.
(h) Indeed, the only action possible, after Mr. Persaud’s theatrics, was for the Speaker to bring the Assembly proceedings to a halt, by virtue of the fact that Mr. Persaud, by his antics, automatically reduced the elected members in the Assembly to 64. Since all elected members were to be present for the vote, any continued sitting of members for the matter at hand would be unconstitutional. That was the effect of the non-vote. Notwithstanding, were the proceedings to continue with the 64 elected members, the resultant tie would have defeated the motion.

(i) The full effect of all that was/is that the No-Confidence motion failed, grounded, and the Executive Government, therefore, remained/

(j) remains, status quo ante the fiasco, the farce that played out that historic day, in the hallowed halls of the Legislature, one of the three arms, or, rather, the three legs of the Government of our beloved Guyana.

(k) As the world knows, only in Guyana can such fun and funny things like this happen. And then, and so, we move on. We are a specially gifted people.

(l) Unless some other drama unfolds, National and Regional Elections should, I predict, be in 2020, since the CCJ always sets out to ‘dig a little deeper’ to the bass of things [The Fairfield Four sings the song, “DIG A LITTLE DEEPER”. Listen to it and hear what great bass sounds like; and what good, fine singing could be, non-distracted by the frills of instrumentation] I find most people listen and get carried away with the soprano of things [the mere melody] and miss the richness and depth of the bass. That is why so many cannot dance properly. They concentrate on the frills.

May God continue to richly bless our beautiful, wonderful, country, and grant us the peace we so desperately deserve, along with the good life for which we all must now, with His help and direction, work together to achieve, in the shortest possible time.

Can we do it? I know we can.
SUMMING UP:
(a) Mr. Persaud failed to notify the Speaker and/or his Party’s Representative of his intention to
to defect from the Party, contrary to the requirements of an entrenched Constitutional provision.
(b) He was not permitted by law to be independent, nor to join with another Parliamentary Party to vote
against his own party. Immediately, what his presence and participation did was to invalidate his vote, even
as the proceedings continued. In fact, after his vote, the proceedings halted, temporarily, then continued,
when it should have been promptly ended, with the Speaker declaring a ‘TIE’ in the voting.
(c) The Speaker erred in not informing Mr. Persaud—and, by extension, the Assembly — the vote for the
Opposition was both procedurally wrong and unconstitutional. The framers never intended such a vote to be
possible. The vote was unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal. It goes to the very heart of that which
constitutes the adverseriality of the Party List requirement for one to be sworn in and be remained as sworn
in as a Member of Parliament.
(d) Mr. Persaud attempted to cross the floor and vote with the other side, while still seated in the
Government benches. That is not permissible under the Laws [Constitution] of Guyana. One cannot ‘cross
the floor’, so to speak, which was what Mr. Persaud, in effect, was permitted to do by the Speaker, who
deemed his vote to be validly cast ! His vote was/is invalid. No twisting, tweaking or twirling of
the vote could render it valid. This was clearly in conflict with the intent and purpose of the Constitutional
Provisions apropos.
(e) Mr. Persaud was not permitted, by law, to vote as he did. The Speaker’s permission was, therefore,
meaningless under the law, and of no effect whatsoever. The Court cannot endorse a clearly illegal act,
especially so when it touches on a clear, fundamental, entrenched Constitutional provision, requiring Mr.
Persaud to have communicated his intention, in writing, to the Speaker. Yet his vote was accepted, with
impunity. That vote was invalid; unconstitutional, nullified by reason of his non-compliance with the
requirements of Article 156 (3) (a) and (b), and by the implications of Article 160 (1) (a) (2) (a) which
compulsorily required of him a notification, in writing, to his Party’s Representative or the Speaker, of his
intent to vote against his party’s interests, pursuant to which he would, most definitely, have been recalled
and replaced, rendering him non persona presente in Parliament; a mere bystander, were he to have opted
to enter the hallowed hall.
(f) Mr. Persaud’s non-compliance with Article 156 (3) (a) and (b) , if none other, should have decisively
impacted the determination of this case, and ought, therefore, to be the tabula vita, the secret, the life-blood
of the State’s case. Why there was no pursuit to tooth-pick this putrescent, suppurate ingredient from the
brawling, broiling stew, which was put to pot in the National Assembly, must now be, I suppose, a question
for the Court of Appeal or the Caribbean Court of Justice to address.
Yes, this case was/is, truly, a broiling. It should really have been – as those of us who take pride in the
rudiments of English discourse would say – more paradigmatically dissected. But the chefs were, it seemed,
aghast, quite unprepared for, and unaccustomed to such an irrepressible human fare screaming YES, YES,
YES., so ecstatically, while a repressing, beseeching alto-sounding refrain kept wailing ‘No, Chandar, No. Ow,
Chandar, No ! No! NO..OOOH’ Right sounds they both were; but, WRONG PLACE; WRONG TIME. WRONG
CHAMBER.
As a conclusionary aside, permit me, if you may, the recall of an occasion, decades ago, at the University of
Guyana. We were reflecting on a piece of legislation presented to the class, on one of the two required Law
and Society Courses [of which Mr. Anil Nandlall and several current practitioners were a part]. I suggested to
our lecturer Mr. Dujon, that they should consider employing as part of the drafting staff at the attorney
general’s office, someone with a good first degree in English. The language had become, then, and continues
still to be so pervasively battered, ill-used, mis-and-under understood! It is a sad, frightening contemplation.
Even our Constitution is badly composed and constituted, rendering its fundamental, grundnorm nature
quite worrying. Small wonder it is, therefore, that there is so much confusion on meanings and
interpretations. In our everyday use of the Language, both formally and informally, words are used so
carelessly and loosely, there seems to be no linguistic ‘grundnorm’ anymore [borrowing from Hans Kelsen’s
concept of the Grundnorm] to even guide and stabilise our crafting and soundly interpreting the Constitution,
our main Grundnorm.
This historic landscape emboldens me now to recommend that, in addition to the English Language person,
our drafting team should now, also, include a mathematician and a logician. Good language refreshes and
interprets the mathematics, and logics converts it to reason, especially and crucially so, as in this extant case,
where the mathematics may deign to linger at the fractionisation of a person, instead of mercifully converting
him to wholeness and wholesomeness.
Yet, daring to be prescient, I sense that our Parliament, Courts and Elections Commission would still be sorely
testing such a team’s skills, for generations hence.
May God order peace and bless our so rich, exquisitely and enchantingly beautiful a country, Guyana.
I rest my case.
Regards,
Gladston F. Alert [Rev.]
(Fitz Alert)