IN 1956, the Privy Council of Britain affirmed a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal of British Guiana in the case of Karamat versus the Queen for murder.

Karamat, the appellant, who died recently, was the uncle of lawyer Saphier Hussain. He was convicted before a judge and jury for the murder of Haniff Jhuman.

Dissatisfied with the sentence, he appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of British Guiana, constituted by Bell C. J., Boland and Stoby J. J.. That Appellate court also dismissed Karamat’s appeal and granted him special leave to appeal to the Privy Council.

The Law Lords took effective measures in their operation in the Karamat appeal; but, in the end, they also found that the appeal had no merit. The Board decided to advise Her Majesty that the matter should be dismissed, and promised to give the reasons later.

During the course of the appellant’s trial on a charge of murder, and before the case for the prosecution was finally closed, the judge, pursuant to the powers conferred by section 44 of the Criminal Law (Procedure) Ordinance of British Guiana — which also provided that the practice and procedure in criminal trials, including that relating to juries, should confirm as nearly as possible to that which obtained in England — directed a view of the locality.

At the view, witnesses who had already given evidence at the trial were present, and any juror who wanted to ask a question put it through the judge, who was present the whole time and, throughout, had control of the proceedings. The witness would give a demonstration as the answer, and counsel would then be invited by the judge to ask questions through him; but no cross-examination was allowed.

The appellant had stated that he did not wish to attend the view, and he did not. On appeal by him against his conviction on the ground, inter alia, that the “view” was not one authorized by the Ordinance when witnesses attended and indicated places by pointing or by words, held: dismissing the appeal, that witness who had already given evidence could attend at the view ; they took part in it in the sense of placing themselves in the positions in which they said they had been at the material times or indicating the positions of others, and that was unobjectionable; there was nothing to show that any more than that took place.

If a view were ordered at some stage of a criminal attending and taking part, he had already given evidence. A view was part of the evidence; it was in substitution for, or supplemental, to plans, photographs and the like. It was eminently desirable that the judge should be present.

So long as the witnesses taking part were recalled to be cross-examined, if desired, the accused person was not in any way prejudiced, but it was essential that every effort should be made to see that witnesses made no communication to the jury except to give a demonstration.

Further, the absence of the appellant from the view afforded no ground of objection; for the holding of the view was part of the trial, and under section 167 (2) of the Criminal Law (Procedure) Ordinance, the court had power to allow the accused – as it did here – to be absent during the part of the trial.

In addition, if an accused person declines to attend a view, he cannot afterwards raise the objection that his absence of itself made the view illegal and a ground for quashing the conviction, if one follows; though he could object if any evidence were given outside the scope of the view as ordered:

Appeal (No. 22 of 1955); by special leave from a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the Supreme Court of British Guiana (Bell. C.J., Boland and Stoby JJ.) (February 24, 1955) dismissing the appellant’s appeal from his conviction on a charge of murder before Hughes J. and a jury at the Criminal Sessions for the County of Demerara, (September 16, 1954).

The appellant was indicted with five other persons, all of whom were acquitted for the murder of Haniff Jhuman, who occupied land which adjoined that on which the appellant and members of his family and other relations lived and farmed.

There had been frequent disputes between the occupants of the two estates arising out of cattle trespass, and undoubtedly there was much ill feeling between them.

There were a series of events and quarrels during September 26, 1953 and the early part of the 27th; and after a fifth quarrel on the morning of the latter day, it was alleged by the Crown that the appellant obtained a twelve-bore gun and two cartridges.

Later in the day, when the deceased man with others approached a cow pen, the appellant, who was engaged in milking, shot at Haniff and killed him, and also shot at and killed the latter’s mother.

The appellant’s defence in the main was that he had shot in self defence; while the others who were indicted with him rested their case on an alibi, contending they were not present when the shooting took place.

There had been, before the end of the case for the Crown, a view of the locus-in-quo by the jury; and the basic submission on this appeal was that the view allowed nine prosecution witnesses — who had already given evidence and had been cross-examined and re-examined, and then remained in court and so heard the evidence of subsequent witnesses — to give further evidence both orally and by conduct before the jury. The appellant did not attend the view.
After hearing the appeal, Lord Goddard, (Lord Chief Justice) announced that their Lordships would humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and that they would give their reasons later.

In delivering the reasons, Lord Goddard said, “This was an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in British Guiana, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a conviction for murder after a trial before Justice Hughes and a jury which, their Lordships were told, had lasted some 14 days.

“At the close of the argument, their Lordships announced that they would humbly advise Her Majesty to dismiss the appeal.”