THE Full Court in 1968 set aside a magistrate’s award in a case of workman’s compensation, after it was found that the magistrate had reached his conclusion of fact by a process of “unjudicial reasoning.”

As a consequence, the workman – Kanhai Singh, who had been awarded compensation for injury to his knee during a fall while working with the Demerara Company Ltd  –  had his award taken away after it was proven that his illness was due to osteo-arthritis and not a fall, as alleged.

The Full Court rejected the magistrate’s decision and ordered the respondent, Singh, to pay costs to the appellant, the Demerara Company Limited.

The circumstances of the case were of such as to justify an appellate Court to disturb the findings of fact.

The facts of the case disclosed  that the respondent had claimed compensation in the Magistrate’s Court under the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, Chapter 111, for an injury which he alleged was caused on December 4, 1964 when he fell and struck his right knee in an accident  which arose out of the course  of his employment with the appellants. The magistrate gave judgment in Singh’s favour, and the appellants appealed to the Full Court.

The respondent Singh had received periodic payments from the appellants for two weeks after the accident, during which time he was being examined by their doctor. The doctor ordered an X-ray examination, and his ultimate diagnosis, some two weeks after the accident, was that the appellant was suffering from a pre-existing
disease, viz, osteo-arthritis.

The respondent claimed that the pain continued and he consulted another doctor, who diagnosed traumatic arthritis. He arrived at that conclusion without the aid of any X-ray pictures, and although asserting that he found no evidence of osteo-arthritis, said that even if his diagnosis was wrong, and the respondent had been suffering from osteo-arthritis, it had been aggravated by the accident.

The magistrate found that the respondent had been suffering from a pre-existing disease as diagnosed by the appellants’ doctor, but that the accident had materially contributed to his existing condition.

The Full Court held the following: (i) That a magistrate, in arriving at his finding of fact, was entitled to disbelieve portions of the evidence, but there must be some logical basis for so doing

(ii) That it is not the function of an appellate tribunal to substitute its own finding of fact, or to interfere with those of the court of trial merely because it took the view that, had it heard the matter at first instance, it may have come to a different conclusion

(iii) That in the present case, the magistrate had arrived at his conclusion of fact by a process of unjudicial reasoning.

The appeal was allowed.
Solicitor General Mr. G.M. Farnum, Q.C., represented the appellants, while Attorney-at-law Mr. Derek Jagan appeared for the respondent.

The Full Curt was constituted by Chief Justice Mr H.B.S. Bollers and Justice Akbar Khan.

According to the judgment of the Full Court, the evidence which was led in the magistrate’s court disclosed that the respondent, on December 4, 1964, while fetching a bundle of cane and crossing a dam on a plank, slipped and fell and hit his right knee. It became swollen and pained him. He reported to the driver, who referred him to the dispensary at Pln. Farm, East Bank Demerara. He was then referred to Dr. Weinstein, the estate doctor, who examined him on December 5, 1964 and ordered an X-ray. On December 15, 1964, the respondent was again examined by Dr Weinstein, who told him to report to the manager on the following day.

On December 16, 1964, the manager informed the respondent that the estate doctor had found him fit for work and had discharged him, and therefore he must report for work. The respondent maintained that his knee was swollen and still pained him. On December 23, 1964, the respondent was examined by Dr. Hugh, a private practitioner, who recommended  six weeks’ temporary disability, and issued such a medical certificate. The estate authority refused to accept this certificate, and the respondent was informed that if he failed to work, he would no longer be employed.

The respondent decided to go back to work, in which he did forking and planting of cane.   He was assisted in fetching the cane tops a distance of 18 to 24 rods by his son, but he found that he could not plant the cane tops as he used to, as his knee  was still paining him. He maintained that he could not fork and plant as well as he did formerly.

According to the judgment of the Full Court, it is apparent from the findings that the learned  magistrate accepted the diagnosis of Dr. Weinstein that the workman was suffering from osteo-arthritis as being correct, and rejected the evidence of Dr. Hugh that he was suffering from traumatic arthritis as being incorrect.
The Magistrate also accepted Dr. Hugh’s evidence  that there was tearing of the ligament of the right knee, and arrived at the conclusion that the pre-existing disease of osteo-arthritis had been aggravated as a result of the accident.

The appellants (employers) now appeal to the court on the two grounds available to them: that is, that the decision was wrong in law in that there was no evidence to support the finding of the magistrate; and secondly, the decision was such that the magistrate, viewing the evidence reasonably, could not properly have so decided.

On the second ground, counsel for the appellant has argued that the magistrate’s acceptance of Dr. Hugh’s evidence that the respondent was suffering from torn ligaments and experienced limitation of movement was unreasonable, as it was based on false premise, that is to say, a faulty diagnosis, and therefore was not open to the
magistrate to rely on Dr. Hugh’s evidence.

The Full Court said, “We are of the view that the magistrate in this case erred in his approach to the evidence when he accepted the evidence of Dr. Weinstein as to his diagnosis that the respondent was suffering from osteo-arthritis, and proceeded to reject the doctor’s evidence that there was no tearing of ligament; but accepted the evidence of Dr. Hugh that there was a tearing of the ligament and limitation of movement.

There was no logical basis for the rejection of the evidence  of Dr. Weinstein that there was no torn ligament, when it was he  who had diagnosed correctly the condition of the respondent, and had first seen and treated the respondent over a period of time, and had taken the trouble to order x-rays, which confirmed his
diagnosis.

“In our view, we can safely say that the magistrate’s view was based on such disregard of evidence to which no reasonable man could come when he disregarded the evidence of Dr. Weinstein that there was no torn ligament, with the result that the inference he drew — that the incident caused the incapacity — was so violent that we could properly interfere  with his decision.

“For these reasons, the appeal must be allowed and the order of the magistrate set aside with costs to the appellants fixed at $25.00 plus the cost of the record, $7.20. The appellants will also have their costs in the court below fixed at $75.00”