Pull Quote: ‘There should be agreement on the view that social cohesion is a prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy; and that is why the search for the most appropriate method of ethnic conflict resolution is necessary, but not sufficient, until it is clearly established that there is no functioning cohesion in society’
ONE OF the underlying premises for advancing the power sharing argument in a multiethnic society is that there are marginalization and discrimination practices in the allocation of rewards, where some ethnics do better than others. Nonetheless, assuming that marginalization and discrimination practices do prevail, would the implantation of a new power sharing political structure, replacing the existing political structure, make a difference to the allocation of rewards? And given that racism, marginalization, and discrimination may be outcomes of ethnocentrism, prejudice, and deep-seated class inequalities, how does a new powersharing political structure correct their deficiencies to the advantage of all ethnic groups?
Last week, I reviewed a few challenges to powersharing, applying Professor Spears’ work on Africa. I said the following:
* In competitive electoral politics, for starters, party leaders generally gravitate toward total power, which makes them not too inclined to be part of any powersharing arrangement; especially so, if these party leaders think they can be triumphant on their own in their electoral pursuits.
* And then there is the disingenuous scenario, where party leaders want to participate in powersharing to hurt their competitors, with whom they previously had an acrimonious relationship.
* In still a different scenario with all the hallmarks of deception, including some people and excluding others would engender factionalism.
* In a further powersharing situation supposedly bringing benefits to all, the zero sum power game, invariably driving politics, would ensure the loss of power to some party leaders, reducing them to zero capacity, vis-а-vis competitive electoral politics.
* Powersharing arrangements rarely present a package attractive to all party leaders, still a different scenario.
* And finally, when some entity like a Parliament approves a package, some party leaders may even sense betrayal because of competing interests among them; as some may feel that they have been shortchanged in what the package could deliver.

There is another challenge that I did not include in last week’s Perspectives. I now present it for your consumption. This challenge, using Spear’s work, suggests that powersharing by two equal partners may not resolve the conflict, because one party leader will seek recognition as the winner and caretaker to power; and what would be the state of affairs of the other party leader not considered the victor?
At the least, the powersharing arrangement will have little or no impact on ethnic conflict resolution, unless the party leaders in the powersharing arrangement really (1) face up to these challenges, (2) are the genuine leaders of the ethnic communities they claim to represent and (3) have the masses’ endorsement of them and the powersharing package.
And assuming that racial and ethnic conflict permeates the gut of society, what evidence is there that a new powersharing structure and institution will end such conflict? And is this the right order to proceed in the face of some ethnic conflict? Should there be something else in place, prior to instituting powersharing structures and institutions?
There should be agreement on the view that social cohesion is a prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy; and that is why the search for the most appropriate method of ethnic conflict resolution is necessary, but not sufficient, until it is clearly established that there is no functioning cohesion in society.
Evidence-based information is necessary to determine the level of societal cohesion. Unfortunately, there are comments/observations of disintegrating race and ethnic relations in this country without any evidence-based information; in fact, quite recently, a particular academic journal carried such comments without the appropriate evidence to support such a claim. Without the relevant evidence-based data and information, it is inappropriate to definitively conclude that particular ethnic groups are the victims of marginalization and discrimination.

Nevertheless, if the evidence-based information makes a determination of no functioning cohesion, then the next stage is building that cohesion through trust. Some people may advocate for trust building through creating new structures and institutions like power- sharing arrangements, etc. But conflict managers need to first build trust between communities rather than trust between institutions and structures (Dembinska 2010; Hardin 2002; Inglehart 1999). And simultaneously fostering intercommunity trust addresses the concerns of ethnocentrism and stereotypes that generally are the precursors of ethnic conflict.

At this time, Guyana continues to be the rhetorical laboratory of many powersharing brand names – Arend Lijphart’s consociational theory (cross-ethnic power sharing); McGarry and O’Leary’s consociational theory; Horowitz’s integrative model, among other elements. These are the proposed treatments for Guyana’s ills, but where’s the evidence-based population diagnosis?

Would patients/physicians use a medication to treat an ailment, if that ailment were not determined in the first place by an evidence-based diagnosis? This question raises issues about the supposed prominence of powersharing advocacy. There are serious challenges, questions about powersharing, but let’s continue the dialogue because a common ground could emerge, even amid protracted disagreements.